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Abstract
Society uses the following game to decide on the supply of a public good.
Each agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contri-
butions are collected and the good is supplied whenever total contributions
exceed a threshold. We study the case where the public good is excludable,
agents have a common value and each agent receives a private signal about
the common value. This game models a standard crowdfunding setting as
it is executed in popular crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and
Indiegogo. We study how well crowdfunding performs from the firm’s per-
spective, in terms of market penetration, and how it performs from the
perspective of society, in terms of efficiency.
This work is supported by the National Science Foundation, under grant CNS-
0435060, grant CCR-0325197 and grant EN-CS-0329609.
1 Introduction
The evolution of the ‘sharing economy’ has made it possible for the general public
to invest in early-stage innovative and economically risky projects and products. In
2015 the total funds raised via this innovative form of funding, commonly referred
Smorodinsky gratefully acknowledges the support the joint United States-Israel Binational
Science Foundation and National Science Foundation grant 2016734, German-Israel Foundation
grant I-1419-118.4/2017, Ministry of Science and Technology grant 19400214, Technion VPR
grants, and the Bernard M. Gordon Center for Systems Engineering at the Technion.
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to as Crowdfunding, already exceeded 34 Billion Dollars and it is by all means the
largest growing avenue for funding new products. Such funding may take the form
of a capital investment, peer-to-peer loans, early purchase of goods, typically in a
nascent and undeveloped stage and new innovative investment structures such as
initial coin offerings.
In traditional funding avenues, the power to decide which projects to support
and which products would prevail was often endowed to small committees of ex-
perts. In the private sector, banks and private equity funds would endow such
decisions to their investment committee while in the public sector such decisions
would often be taken by a small group of civil servants and public officials. Crowd-
funding essentially revokes the power of such small teams and endows the funding
decision to the crowd with the basic premise that the crowd is smarter than any
small team of experts. The goal of this paper is to study how well the wisdom of
the crowd performs in the context of funding decisions.
Inspired by popular crowdfunding platforms such as ‘Kickstarter’ and ‘In-
diegogo’ we introduce a simple game of incomplete information, which we dub
the Crowdfunding game. A firm who want to propose a new product offers the
the following game to its potential customer base: The firm posts a price for its
product and, in addition, sets a revenue goal.1 The product is at a nascent stage
and so its true value is yet unknown. Potential customers may have some private
information regarding the value of the product. Based on this information the
customers choose whether or not to buy the product at the posted price (here-
inafter we refer to this action as a contribution). If the total contributions pledged
in the campaign exceed the revenue goal then contributions are collected and the
firm supplies the product to the contributors. Otherwise contributions are not
collected.
As crowdfunding campaigns are often associated with early stage products,
when the demand is unknown, they serve a few objectives. From the firm’s per-
spective the goal of the crowdfunding campaign is to raise funds in order to develop
the product. Equally as important, the campaign serves to raise awareness to the
product and so it serves as a means to penetrate the market and provide expo-
sure to a critical mass of early adopters. From society’s point of view it serves
to aggregate the information from the crowd and so it serves as an institution to
tunnel funds to the viable products. Ideally, crowdfunding campaigns will deny
funds from low value products and projects while guaranteeing the support to high
1In reality the firms typically propose more than a single variant of the product alongside a
menu of posted prices.
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value products and projects.
Thus, we associate with each game two indices - a (market) Participation Index
which is associated with how well do campaigns perform in terms of attracting
contributors, and a Correctness Index that is associated with how well do cam-
paigns harness the wisdom of the crowd to support the high quality products while
denying funds to the low quality ones.
More technically, the Crowdfunding Game is a game of incomplete information
played among a population of n potential contributors. The common value of the
product, v, is unknown and players have some private information about this
value. A player must decide whether or not to buy the product at some posted
price, τ (‘contribute’). If a player contributes and the total number of contributors
exceeds some preset threshold, B, then her utility is v − τ .2 Otherwise it is zero.
In particular foregoing the contribution opportunity entails a utility of zero. The
two measures of success for a crowdfunding game that we study are:
• The correctness index of a game is defined as the probability that the game
ends up doing the correct thing. That is, the probability the product be
funded when its value is high or is rejected when its value is low. The
correctness index measures how well the crowdfunding aggregates the private
information from the buyers in order to make sure the firm pursues the
product only when it is viable.
• The market penetration index is the expected number of buyers provided
that the product is supplied, i.e, the threshold is surpassed. This number
serves as a proxy for success of the campaign as a means to attract further
investments.
Our proposed crowdfunding game is a stylized model for how crowdfunding
actually takes place in reality. One obvious limitation of the current model is
that it comprises of a simultaneous move game, whereas in reality campaigns are
executed over a period of time and agents have the option to wait for others
(possibly more informed) agents to make a pledge before they commit. This,
however, is not a major drawback of the model as it has been noticed empirically
that the majority of contributions made by unaffiliated players (no family and
friends) take place just before the campaign’s deadline (see [10]).
2Alternatively, one can set the threshold in terms of contributions pledged and not in terms
of the number of contributors. We chose the latter form as it seems that market traction often
plays a more important role than actual revenues.
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The crowdfunding game is sufficiently simple and abstract to serve as a model
for the formation of institutions. For example, consider the evolution of multi-
national institutions (e.g., the UN’s International Court of Justice in Hague, the
Kyoto Protocol or the Geneva Conventions) where these institutions form only if
supported by sufficiently many nations and serve the supporting nations only. In
a similar vein, the formation of industry standards can be modeled as a Crowd-
funding game.
1.1 Main findings
Our first result establishes the existence of a symmetric, non-trivial equilibrium in
crowdfunding games. It turns out that, for some parameter combinations, such an
equilibrium necessarily exists while for others it is guaranteed to exist only when
the crowd is large enough. Once this has been established we turn to study the
consequences of such symmetric equilibria of large crowdfunding games in terms
of both aforementioned two success measures:
• We provide a tight bound on the correctness index which is strictly less
than one. Thus, no matter how the campaign goal is set, full information
aggregation cannot be guaranteed. We compare this with the efficiency
guarantees of majority voting implied by Condorcet Jury Theorem.
• We provide a bound on the penetration index and we show that by setting
the champaign goal optimally the resulting market penetration is higher
than the prior.
Our analysis is typically done for three distinct cases:
• Games in which the price is cheap, and players contribute regardless of their
personal signal.
• Games with moderate prices where the only (symmetric) equilibrium is one
in which players with a high signal surely contribute while those with a low
signal either decline or take a mixed strategy whereby they contribute at a
positive probability, strictly less than one; and
• Games with expensive prices where, for sufficiently low thresholds, the only
(symmetric) equilibrium is one in which players with a low signal opt-out
and players with a high signal play a mixed strategy.
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In addition to the aforementioned theoretical results we present some computa-
tional results that pertain to symmetric equilibria in moderate size crowdfunding
games. Inspired by related empirical research we focus on games with around
100− 1000 players, which is a realstic estimate for real-world crowdfunding cam-
paigns. By and large the computations corroborate that our theoretical findings
in the asymptotic analysis prevail in moderate size games.
1.2 Related Literature
The lion’s share of the literature on crowdfunding takes an empirical approach
according. In this context, one can divide the relevant literature into two strands.
One strand uses crowdfunding data to calibrate parameters of some complex sys-
tems to match the date best (e.g., [11],[5], and [18]). In contrast with our model,
the laws of motion for the underlying models in these papers are not derived from
strategic analysis of the players and so they are not the result of any equilibrium
analysis.3
In another strand of the relevant empirical literature, data from online crowd-
funding platforms is summarized statistically and some overarching observations
are made on such campaigns, often in the context of additional variables such as
culture and geography (e.g., Hemer [7]). Three of these observations are worth
noting in the context of our work: Yum et al. [19] argue that firms use the crowd-
funding platform as a means for information gathering. Mollick [14] observes that
most crowdfunding campaigns reach extreme results. Either, the number of con-
tributors to a campaign is small or it is over subscribed. The same author uses a
survey of over 47, 000 contributors to conclude that about 9 percent of successful
campaigns never deliver ([15]).
Recent empirical papers ([9], [10]) study data from 14, 704 “Kickstarter” cam-
paigns held between 2012 and 2014 and provide new insights into crowdfunding
campaigns: (1) The magnitude of contributions is greater in the first and last week
of a campaign’s time span yielding a “U-shape” pattern over time. This U-shape
is seen both in successful and failed campaigns (by ‘failure’ we mean a campaign
for which the contributions fell short of the threshold). (2) In most cases, failed
campaigns fail by a large margin while successful ones succeed only by a thread.
(3) Once the campaign goal is reached, the rate of contributions decreases signifi-
cantly. In [9], the authors go on and provide a behavioral model that is compatible
3For example, Yang et al [18] assume that the the decision of every agent is determined by
the historic success rate of previous projects.
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with the data, but does not assume agents are rational (or common knowledge
thereof). For example, in the proposed model agents are over confident of their
influence on the campaign outcome, an observations that is often inconsistent with
equilibrium analysis and common knowledge of rationality.
[10] examines the U-shape contributions pattern and find that the early backers
are not necessarily playing to maximize their value as they primarily belong to the
social circle of the entrepreneur (friends and family). On the other hand, most of
the activity of unaffiliated backers takes place at the very end of the campaign.
Cating this observation onto our model suggests that our crowdfunding game
should be thought of as a model of the final stage of the campaign, when value-
maximizing agents take action.
Game theoretical models have been used to study a variety of aspects of crowd-
funding. Strausz [17] studies the vulnerability of crowd-funding platforms to en-
trepreneurial moral hazard. In contrast with our model the firm has the informa-
tional advantage and may seek to embezzle part of the funds. The paper offers
an efficient mechanism to circumvent this issue. Chemla and Tinn [4] compare
two common crowdfunding mechanisms - “All-or-Nothing (AoN)” and “Keep-it-
All (KiA)”. In AoN, as in our model, funds are collected only if a pre-determined
threshold is reached. In the KiA mechanism this threshold is set to zero. The pa-
per shows that AoN dominates KiA in terms of efficiency and is less vulnerable to
moral hazard. Kumar et al [8] study the competition between two means for fund
raising - crowdfunding and loans. They go on and show the connection between
the cost of capital, the level of price discrimination in the crowdfunding campaign
and the efficiency of the final allocation.
Finally, Alaei, Malekian and Mostagir [2], consider a model of crowdfunding
where buyers with private valuations take actions sequentially. Whereas their
model is not strategic, and players follow some ad-hoc ‘natural’ strategy, their
conclusion supports the main finding in Mollick [14]. Namely, crowdfunding cam-
paigns most often end in one of two extreme outcomes, they either attract a few
contributors or are oversubscribed.
Somewhat related to our model is the line of research on the Condorcet model.
In the standard model, similar to the crowdfunding game, players have a state
dependant common value with some private information and ea player can take
one of two actions (‘vote’). The Condorcet Jury theorem argues that the majority
rule will aggregate information. In other words it will result in the correct decision
if voters vote naively (‘truthfully’) and the population is large enough (this is no
more than the law of large numbers). Austen-Smith and Banks [3] challenge
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this premise by noting that naive voting is not necessarily rational. Mclennan [13]
provides an alternative framework where Condorcet’s asymptotic efficiency results
hold in equilibrium. In contrast with the Condorcet Jury theorem and Mclennan’s
result the crowdfunding game need not aggregate information fully and could lead
to an inefficient outcome, even in large populations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the Crowdfunding
game and our first result regarding existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. In
section 3 we present our asymptotic results for the Crowdfunding game, related
to large markets. In Section 4 we provide some calculations for the outcome of
such games in smaller markets. We conclude in Section 6 and suggest some future
avenues of further investigation.
2 The Crowdfunding Game
A crowdfunding game is a game of incomplete information played among a pop-
ulation of n potential contributors (or players). An unknown state of nature
ω ∈ Ω = {H,L} is drawn with prior probabilities (µ, 1−µ), respectively. In state
ω the common value of the product is vω. Conditional on the realized state ω,
a private signal si ∈ Si = {h, l} is drawn independently for every player i. We
assume p = Pr(si = h|ω = H) = Pr(si = l|ω = L) > 0.5. Each player i has a
binary action set, Ai = {0, 1}, with ai = 1 representing a decision to contribute.
A contribution can be seen, in fact, as a commitment to buy the product at some
pre-set price, τ , if it is eventually supplied. The action ai = 0 represents a decision
to opt-out and not to contribute. The utility of every player i ∈ N is defined as
follows
ui(ai, a−i, ω) =


vH − τ if ai = 1 and
∑n
j=1 aj ≥ B and ω = H
vL − τ if ai = 1 and
∑n
j=1 aj ≥ B and ω = L
0 otherwise
. (1)
In words, whenever player i chooses to opt-out, she receives a utility of zero. If
she chooses to contribute, then her utility is determined by the total number of
contributors. If less than B players contributed then the product is not supplied
and her utility is zero. If the number of contributions exceeds B then her utility is
determined by the state of nature and equals vH−τ in state H and vL−τ in state
L. Hereinafter we assume, without loss of generality, that 0 = vL < τ < vH = 1
and denote the corresponding game by Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ).
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A strategy for player i is a mapping σi : Si → ∆Ai. For simplicity we identify
σi(s) with the probability that player i assigns to the action 1 (‘contribute’),
conditional on receiving signal s. A strategy profile is called symmetric if σi = σj
for all players i, j ∈ N .
The distribution over the states of nature and the corresponding vector of
signals, coupled with a strategy profile, σ, induce a probability distribution over
the players’ actions profile. A strategy profile σ forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
if
Eσ(ui(σi(si), σ−i(s−i))) ≥ Eσ(ui(ai, σ−i(s−i))) ∀i, ∀si ∈ Si, ∀ai ∈ Ai,
where the expectation is taken w.r.t to the aforementioned probability distribution.
One obvious equilibrium in the crowdfunding game, whenever B > 1, is one
where all players choose to opt-out, in which case the revenue goal is never met
and the product is never supplied. To avoid such equilibria we restrict attention
to equilibria for which there is a positive probability that the good be supplied:
Definition 1. A strategy profile (in particular an equilibrium strategy profile)
σ = (σ1, . . . , σi, . . . , σn) is called non-trivial if,
Prσ(
∑
i
ai ≥ B) > 0.
Our first result is related to the existence and uniqueness of non-trivial,symmetric
equilibria. We show that in any crowdfunding game, there can be at most one
such equilibrium. Furthermore, when the population is large enough, such an
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist.
Theorem 1. (1) No crowdfunding game has more than one symmetric non-trivial
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. (2) Consider the sequence {Bn}∞n=1 where limn→∞ Bnn = q
for some q ∈ (0, 1]. For any 4-tuple of parameters (q, µ, p, τ) there exists some N
such that for any n > N, the crowdfunding game Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ) has a unique
symmetric non-trivial Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to Appendix A.
2.1 Performance Measures
In the introduction we discuss the various objectives of crowdfunding campaigns.
The following two indices correspond to two of these objectives. The first is the
correctness index of a game which pertains to how well the game tunnels funds.
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The second is the participation index of a game which refers to how well does the
campaign attract contributions. Formally, let σ∗ denote the unique symmetric
non-trivial equilibrium of the game Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ). Then:
The Correctness Index is the following expectation:
θ(n,B, µ, p, τ) = µPrσ∗(c
H
n ≥ B) + (1− µ)Prσ∗(cLn < B) (2)
where cωn =
∑n
i=1 ai is the expected number of contributors, conditional on the
realized state ω ∈ {L,H}. The first summand captures the probability of a
correct outcome whenever the state of the world if H and ideally the product
should be supplied and the second summand captures the opposite situation. If
no such equilibrium exists then we set θ(n,B, µ, p, τ) = 0.
The Correctness index of a large crowdfunding game, associated with the pa-
rameters (µ, p, τ) is
θ(µ, p, τ) = lim
n→∞
max
B∈{1...n}
θ(n,B, µ, p, τ).
The Participation Index is the following expectation:
R(n,B, µ, p, τ) = Eσ∗
[cn
n
χ(cn ≥ B)
]
= Prσ∗(cn ≥ B)Eσ∗
[cn
n
|cn ≥ B
]
. (3)
Where cn counts the number of contributors and χ(A) is the indicator function
of the event A. If no such equilibrium exists then we set R(n,B, µ, p, τ) = 0. In
words, the Participation Index is the expected number of contributions collected
(conditional on the campaign target being met).
The Participation index of a large crowdfunding game, associated with the
parameters (µ, p, τ) is
R(µ, p, τ) = lim
n→∞
max
B∈{1...n}
R(n,B, µ, p, τ).
2.2 The role of B
The threshold B that is prevalent in many crowdfunding campaigns (often pre-
sented in terms of revenues and not in terms of contributors) plays a dual role.
From the society’s perspective, it introduces a barrier to entry, guaranteeing funds
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only to those project with sufficient public support. The underlying implicit as-
sumption is that public support will only be provided whenever the collective
wisdom assigns high probability to the state H . In addition, from the firm’s point
of view it serves to entice participants. The fact that a contribution is collected
only when the overall support is high enough offers an inherent ‘social’ insurance.
That is, when a certain participant is contemplating whether to contribute he
does not base his decision only on his private information but also on the likeli-
hood the product is good product, conditional that the threshold B is reached.
Consequently, players that are initially doubtful (those with a low signal) will also
contemplate a contribution. However, on the other hand, a high threshold may
imply lower participation even if more players contemplate a contribution. This
is because our notion of participation refers to the number of contributions that
are actually collected.
Let us now see how these arguments play out in an example.
Example 1. Consider the following symmetric 3-player crowdfunding game: Γ(n =
3, B, µ = 0.5, p = 0.75, τ = 0.5):
• We first assume a low threshold, B = 1. Such a low threshold offers no
social insurance and each contribution is necessarily collected. In this case
the expected utility of a player from contributing is Pr(ω = H|si)(1 −
τ) − Pr(ω = L|si)τ which is equal 0.25 > 0 whenever a player receives
a high signal (si = h) and −0.25 < 0 whenever he receives a low signal.
The participation index is therefore the expected proportion of high signals,
which is equal 0.5 and the correctness index is 0.5(1− 0.253) + 0.5(0.75)3 =
0.703.
• In contrast, consider the high threshold, B = 3. As above, players receiving
the high signal will surely contribute. However, having only the high signal
players contribute is no longer an equilibrium because of the social insurance
effect. That is, if only high signal players contribute, then a low signal player
is better-off contributing as in this case he assigns a probability of 0.75 to
ω = H conditional on reaching the threshold B = 3. However, if all low type
player choose to contribute, then the social insurance is no longer valid.
Thus, in equilibrium, they use it with caution, or more formally play a
mixed strategy. The actual probability of contribution for the low signal
players in equilibrium turns out to be λ = 0.302. Now the probability of a
successful campaign conditional on the state being H is 0.563 whereas the
probability of a failed campaign conditional on state L is 0.892. From this
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we can compute that the correctness index is equal 0.727, higher than the
case B = 1. On the other hand the participation index is now 0.335, lower
than the case B = 1.
3 Asymptotic Results
We present results for three distinct scenarios, depending on the product pric-
ing. We distinguish between three price levels: cheap, moderate and expen-
sive, formulated as follows. Let pl = Pr(ω = H|si = l) = (1−p)(1−µ)pµ+(1−p)(1−µ) and
ph = Pr(ω = H|si = h) = pµpµ+(1−p)(1−µ) be the two possible posterior expecta-
tions over the value of good, depending on the signal received. Obviously ph > pl.
Recall the values of the product at the two states, vH = 1 and vL = 0, which in
turn implies that the posterior forms the maximal price an agent would pay for
the good in a simple take-it-or-leave setting.The three cases we study are:
• The campaign offers a cheap price whenever τ ≤ pl < ph. It should not be
surprising that when the campaign offers a cheap price both types of agents
necessarily contribute. Consequently, the crowd does not convey its wisdom.
• The campaign offers a moderate price whenever pl < τ < ph. Whereas
players a low signal would not buy the good they nevertheless participate in
the campaign (recall Example 1).
• The campaign offers an expensive price whenever pl < ph ≤ τ . Whereas
both types would decline to but the good at the price τ participation does
take place due to the inherent social insurance.
3.1 Cheap Prices
A Crowdfunding game is cheaply priced whenever τ < Prµ(ω = H|si = l). In
such games the outcome is trivial as the unique symmetric equilibrium (which is
necessarily non trivial) is for all players (low and high) to participate:
Theorem 2. In any crowdfunding game with a cheap price there exists a unique
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium where all players contribute. This equilib-
rium is non-trivial.
The proof of Theorem 2 is relegated to Appendix A however the intuition
behind it is quite straightforward. Whenever the price is cheap both types of
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players are happy to buy it even if their contributions will surely be collected, and
do not require the social insurance for that.
Given the simplicity of the equilibrium strategies we can easily derive the value
of the two indices:
Theorem 3. For any crowdfunding game, Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ), with a cheap price:
• θ(n,B, µ, p, τ) = µ; and
• R(n,B, µ, p, τ) = 1.
Proof. The proof follows immediate from Theorem 2 and the corresponding defi-
nitions of the two indices
3.2 Moderate Prices
When a campaign price is moderate, high type players find the price attractive
while low type players do not:
Pr(ω = H|si = l) =< τ < Pr(ω = H|si = h).
We begin by establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric non-
trivial equilibrium:
Theorem 4. For any crowdfunding game, Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ), with a moderate price,
there exists a unique symmetric non-trivial Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n).
Moreover, σ∗i has the following form,
σ∗i (si) =


1 if si = h
λ = λ(n,B, µ, p, τ) ∈ [0, 1) if si = l.
. (4)
We relegate the proof to the Appendix A but provide some intuition. We refer
to a player who receives the signal h as a ‘high’ player and to a player who receives
the signal l as a ‘low’ player. The high player is perfectly happy with the price
and would contribute even without the social insurance embedded in the threshold
B. What about ‘low’ players? Assume only high players contribute and none of
the low players do. Then each low player has an incentive to leverage the social
insurance by deviating and contributing. If, on the other hand, all low players as
well as all high players contribute then there is no social insurance and each low
player can profitably deviate by opting out. By properly mixing between the two
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actions each low player can be made indifferent and hence best-replies by mixing.
This establishes the equilibrium.
In the following lemma we characterize the limit equilibrium strategy of the low
player as the size of the population increases. We restrict the analysis to sequences
of games where the the limit, per-capita, threshold exists (∃ limn→∞ Bnn = q for
some q ∈ [0, 1]).
Lemma 1. Let {Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ)}n be a sequence of moderately priced crowdfund-
ing games such that limn→∞
Bn
n
= q for some q ∈ [0, 1]. Then the limit equilibrium
strategy is:
lim
n→∞
σ∗n(l) =


0 if q ≤ 1− p
q−(1−p)
p
otherwise
(5)
With this computation at hand we can now turn to study the Correctness
index for large markets:
Our second result characterizes the asymptotic correctness of the moderate
pricing Crowdfunding game.
Theorem 5. For any large crowdfunding game with prior µ, signal quality p and
a moderate price τ the probability of making the correct choice is given by:
θ(µ, p, τ) = 1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ. (6)
In fact, a careful reading of the proof suggests that the following slightly
stronger result holds. Fix the prior µ, signal quality p and a moderate price
τ . If for every n the threshold Bn satisfies ???? (MORAN LEASE FILL IN)
then limn θ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ) = 1 − 1−pp 1−ττ µ. To see why this is a bit stronger recall
that the definition of θ(µ, p, τ) pertains to the threshold B that maximizes the
correctness indices along the sequence and not to arbitrary thresholds.
An immediate conclusion is that large crowdfunding campaigns, in the format
we study, necessarily exhibit market failure when prices are moderate.4 This
failure probability is given by 1−p
p
1−τ
τ
µ and the following comparative statics follow
immediately:
Corollary 1. . For any large crowdfunding game with prior µ, signal quality p and
a moderate price τ the market failure probability decreases as one of the following
4Compare this observation with Condorcet’s jury theorem which argues that in a majority
vote, large societies necessarily choose the correct alternative.
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occurs: (1) the signal accuracy of the signal increases, (2) the price increases; and
(3) the prior probability (for the value being high) decreases.5
.
Below we provide an outline of the proof of Theorem 5 while relegating the full
proof to Appendix A. The proof leverages the intuition hinges that any player,
conditional on the actual state of nature, is (almost) non-pivotal (similar to [1] and
[12]). In other words, whenever the population is large enough, each individual
player deems her own action to have impact on the probability of supply, condi-
tional on knowing the state of nature. Thus, in each state ω the probability of
supply, given her contribution and the state ω is approximately equal Pr(cωn ≥ B).
Proof Outline of Theorem 5: Consider the sequence of games {Γ(n, n
2
, µ, p, τ)}∞n=2.
By Lemma 1, the corresponding sequence of equilibrium strategies for low players
converges to
lim
n→∞
σ∗n(l) =
2p− 1
2p
. (7)
Let αω˜ = Prσ(ai = 1|ω = ω˜) be the probability that an arbitrary player
contribute in the state ω˜. Using equation (7) and the fact that high players
necessarily contribute we get that αH converges to 3p−1
2p
> 1
2
. This implies that the
probability for a successful campaign, conditional on the state H approaches one.
Using similar computations and relying on the indifference of the low players,
we can show that whenever the state is L the probability of success approaches
1−p
p
µ
1−µ
1−τ
τ
. Combining these two computations yields a lower bound:
θ(µ, p, τ) ≥ 1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ.
To show the opposite inequality consider an arbitrary sequence {Bn} and as-
sume that the following three sequences converge: {θ(n,B, µ, p, τ)}, {Pr(cHn ≥
B}n and {Pr(cLn ≥ B)}n (otherwise, consider a sub-sequence). Let us denote the
corresponding limits by θ∗, x∗ and y∗. By the definition of the correctness index
and by Lemma 1 we get,
θ∗ = µx∗ + (1− µ)(1− y∗). (8)
Recall that a ‘low’ player mixes and so is indifferent between the two actions.
Taking the limit of the indifference equation of the ‘low’ players yields:
(1− p)µx∗(1− τ)− p(1− µ)y∗τ = 0. (9)
5Note the the constraint that prices are moderate rules out the extreme case µ = 1 in which
it would have been surprising to learn of the possibility of market failure.
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By equations (8) and (9), the asymptotic correctness value is bounded above by
the solution for the following linear program:
max µx∗ + (1− µ)(1− y∗)
s.t. 1 ≥ x∗, y∗ ≥ 0
(1− p)µx∗(1− τ)− (1− µ)py∗τ = 0,
(10)
which is 1− 1−p
p
1−τ
τ
µ.
We now to compute the Participation index for large markets when prices are
moderate:
Theorem 6. For any large crowdfunding game with prior µ, signal quality p and
a moderate price τ , the participation index is given by:
R(µ, p, τ) = µ(1 +
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
) (11)
Note that participation is always greater the µ. Furthermore it increases as
the price decreases and as the prior (for the good state) increases. Perhaps less
intuitive is the conclusion that penetration decreases as the signal, p, becomes
more accurate. A possible explanation is that with less accuracy the ‘low’ players
put more emphasis on the aforementioned social insurance. This is manifested
in equation (7) which shows that the contribution probability of such players
increases in p.
Proof Outline of Theorem 6: Let {Γ(n, qn, µ, p, τ)}∞n=1 be a sequence of crowd-
funding games. We discuss the two different cases, q > 1 − p and q ≤ 1 − p,
separately.
Case 1, q > 1− p: By Lemma 1
lim
n→∞
σ∗n(l) =
q − (1− p)
p
> 0. (12)
Let αω˜n = Prσ∗n(ai = 1|ω = ω˜) be the probability that an arbitrary player con-
tributes in the state ω˜. Using equation (12) and the fact that high players necessar-
ily contribute we get that αHn converges to p+(1−p) q−(1−p)p > q. This implies that
the probability for a successful campaign, conditional on the state H approaches
one. Using similar computations and relying on the indifference of the low play-
ers and the observation that in large games, players are (almost) non-pivotal,
we can show that whenever the state is L, the probability of success approaches
1−p
p
µ
1−µ
1−τ
τ
. Combining these two computations yields the unconditional probabil-
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ity of a successful campaign:
lim
n→∞
Pr(cn ≥ Bn) = lim
n→∞
Pr(
cn
n
≥ q) =
µ+ (1− µ)1− p
p
µ
1− µ
1− τ
τ
= µ(1 +
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
).
(13)
The Participation index is the expected number of contributions conditional
on the campaign’s success and therefore
R(µ, p, τ) ≥ lim
n→∞
R(n,Bn, µ, p, τ) ≥ lim
n→∞
Pr(cn ≥ Bn) = µ(1 + 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
).
In addition, for any q the expected number of contribution conditional on a
successful campaign is bounded below:
lim
n→∞
R(n,Bn, µ, p, τ) ≥ q(µ(1 + 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
)).
Maximizing over q > 1− p yields R(µ, p, τ) ≥ µ(1 + 1−p
p
1−τ
τ
), as desired.
Case 2, q ≤ 1 − p: By Lemma 1 ‘low’ players opt-out and only high players
contribute. Thus, the expected number of contributions conditional on success
equals the expected number of ‘high’ players which yields an upper bound,
lim
n→∞
R(n, qn, µ, τ) ≤ pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ).
As prices are moderate, this implies pµ+ (1 − p)(1 − µ) ≤ µ(1 + 1−p
p
1−τ
τ
), in the
second case.
Combining the two cases yields the desired result.
3.3 Expensive prices
The price in the crowdfunding game is expensive whenever it is high enough such
that none of the players would buy it without any additional insurance. Formally,
τ > Prµ(ω = H|si = h).
In contrast with the two previous cases, a symmetric non-trivial equilibrium
need not exist when the population is small. However, by Theorem 1, when we
consider large games, existence of exactly one non-trivial, symmetric, Bayes-Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed.
Theorem 7. Let {Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ)}n be a sequence of expensively priced crowd-
funding games such that limn→∞
Bn
n
= q for some q ∈ [0, 1]. Then the limit
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equilibrium strategy is:
lim
n→∞
σ∗n(l) =


0 if q ≤ 1− p
q−(1−p)
p
otherwise
and lim
n→∞
σ∗n(h) =


q
1−p
if q ≤ 1− p
1 otherwise
(14)
The proof of Theorem 7 is relegated to Appendix A.4.
By Theorem 7, the equilibrium strategy depends on how high the threshold is.
That is, even when the price is expensive, the equilibrium may take a similar form
as that of the moderate price case whereby high players necessarily contribute
while low players mix. However, for certain threshold levels we observe a different
form of equilibrium, whereby low players opt-out while high players rely on the
social insurance and mix.
The value of the two indices is given in the two last theorems. The main ideas
underlying these proofs are similar to the analysis of the moderate price case.
Theorem 8.
θ(µ, p, τ) = 1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ. (15)
Theorem 9.
• If µ < 1
3
and p ≤ √3 − 1, or if µ < 1
3
, p >
√
3 − 1 and τ > 2µ
(1−µ)p+2(1−p)µ)
then
R(µ, p, τ) = µp+ (1− µ)1− p
2
=
(3µ− 1)p+ (1− µ)
2
.
• Otherwise,
R(µ, p, τ) = µ(1 +
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
)
Note that participation index is more than the prior, µ. I addition, note that
whenever the equilibrium takes the form where only high players participate the
participation decreases as signals become more accurate.
MORAN - ANYMORE INTERESTING COMPARATIVE STATICS? ????????????
4 Crowdfunding in small populations
Our theoretical results pertain to the asymptotic case and so are relevant to large
markets. Empirical data suggests that crowdfunding campaigns eventually attract
around 100 contributors (See [9] and [14] ). For example, in [9], they find that the
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Table 1: Γ(n = 100, B, µ = 0.5, p, τ).
p B τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7
ψ λ θ R ψ λ θ R
0.55
9 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.126 0 0.570 0.019
44 1 0.044 0.606 0.478 0.957 0 0.751 0.366
98 1 0.954 0.561 0.594 1 0.866 0.518 0.037
0.75
9 1 0 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 0.5
44 1 0.211 0.854 0.469 1 0.170 0.941 0.571
98 1 0.951 0.795 0.575 1 .931 0.823 0.422
average number of contributors to Kickstarter campaigns that took place during
March and April of 2012 was 100.32. These empirical results suggest that an initial
market size for such campaigns is of the of the order of magnitude of 100− 1000.
In order to validate our theoretical results we compute the equilibrium strate-
gies ( σ∗) and the value of the to indices for the relevant market size (n = 100 and
n = 1000). We do so for a variety of parameter values (threshold, signal accuracy
and price). The result for a market size of n = 100 are depicted in Table 1 while
those for n = 1000 are depicted in Table 2. Finally, Table 3 details the asymptotic
results for the corresponding parameter values (recall that the asymptotic results
are stated in terms of the optimal threshold).
Our theoretical results for case where prices are cheap hold for any market
size and so the calculations we report on below are only for the case of moderate
prices ((p, τ) equal (0.55, 0.5), (0.75, 0.5) , (0.75, 0.7) ) and high prices ( (p, τ) =
(0.55, 0.7) ).
The tables of results below are partial and, in particular focus on the symmetric
prior. The interested reader is referred to Appendix B for the calculations in a
wider variety of parameters, including asymmetric priors.
There are several observations to be made from these tables (and from the
additional calculations reported in Appendix B):
• The most interesting observation is that our asymptotic analysis provides
a good approximation for Crowdfunding games with a realistic market size.
The computed strategies converge quite fast and the corresponding bounds
on the two indices are already quite relevant for these values. This holds both
when prices high and more so when prices are moderate. This observation
is robust with respect to the value of the signal accuracy and the price.
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Table 2: Γ(n = 1000, B, µ = 0.5, p, τ).
p B τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7
ψ λ θ R ψ λ θ R
0.55
90 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.198 0 0.752 0.07
440 1 0.006 0.596 0.462 0.977 0 0.745 0.384
980 1 0.968 0.586 0.845 1 0.954 .668 0.341
0.75
90 1 0 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 0.5
440 1 0.243 0.839 0.477 1 0.23 0.932 0.434
980 1 0.970 0.834 0.659 1 .966 0.929 0.565
Table 3: Large markets: θ(µ = 0.5, p, τ) and R(µ = 0.5, p, τ)
p q τ = 0.5 τ = 0.7
ψ λ maxθ(µ, p, τ) maxR(µ, p, τ) ψ λ maxθ(µ, p, τ) maxR(µ, p, τ)
0.55
0.09 1 0
0.590 0.909
0.2 0
0.825 0.6750.44 1 0 0.978 0
0.98 1 0.964 1 0.964
0.75
0.09 1 0
0.833 0.667
1 0
0.929 0.5710.44 1 0.253 0.978 0.253
0.98 1 0.973 1 0.973
• Additionally, we observe that when the signal is weak (p = 0.55) and the
threshold is low (B ≈ n
3
), low type players always opt-out. Nevertheless,
the number of high type players is sufficient to induce production even if
ω = L which causes a rapid deterioration of the Correcteness index. As B
increases the risk facing low type players decreases and therefore we can see
that throughout the table, a higher threshold B leads to a higher probability
that a low player will contribute (a higher λ)
• As predicted the correctness index is an increasing with price and decreasing
with µ. Similarly the participation index is an increasing function of the prior
µ and a decreasing function of prices. This can be verified in Table 4 bellow.
• Surprisingly, for a variety of parameter combinations the theoretical predic-
tions are quite accurate even for a very small populations, n ∈ {5, 10} (see
the table in Appendix B ).
In the following table we can see the valuation in the calculations for varying
priors. We can see that, as expected, Participation increases with the prior. How-
ever, ceteris paribus, in some cases, an increase in the prior may induce a decrease
in the correctness. Intuitively, this occurs as the public signal weight increases in
the players’ contribution decision.
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Table 4: Correctness and Participation of Γ(n = 100, B = 98, µ, p = 0.75, τ)
n B µ p τ θ(n,B, µ, p, τ) R(n,B, µ, p, τ) θ(µ, p, τ) R(µ, p, τ)
100 50 0.2 0.75 0.5 0.946 0.189 0.933 0.267
100 50 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.852 0.489 0.833 0.667
100 50 0.7 0.75 0.5 0.776 0.713 0.767 0.933
100 50 0.2 0.75 0.7 0.978 0.171 0.971 0.229
100 50 0.5 0.75 0.7 0.940 0.437 0.929 0.571
100 50 0.7 0.75 0.7 0.911 0.623 0.900 0.700
1000 500 0.2 0.75 0.5 0.937 0.197 0.933 0.267
1000 500 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.839 0.497 0.833 0.667
1000 500 0.7 0.75 0.5 0.769 0.705 0.767 0.933
1000 500 0.2 0.75 0.7 0.973 0.178 0.971 0.229
1000 500 0.5 0.75 0.7 0.932 0.448 0.929 0.571
1000 500 0.7 0.75 0.7 0.903 0.631 0.900 0.700
5 Discussion
In this paper we report theoretical findings about crowdfunding campaigns - strate-
gies, correctness and participation - for large markets (presented in terms of asymp-
totic results). We then go on to compute outcomes in campaigns where the market
size is inspired by empirical findings using field data. The contribution of the com-
putational part is in showing that the theory holds even for markets of small size.
Our model supports variations in the product price and in the prior belief that
the product is viable. The study of asymmetric prior beliefs is of importance as a
typical crowdfunding scenario is that of a high-risk product in its pre-development
stage. To model this one should consider a low prior for the state of the world
where the product is valuable. Another type of risk is manifested in the price
variation. Expensively priced product embed a greater loss if they are not viable
and smaller gains if they are.
When examining the various cases, we found that the risk associated with a
high price are, in a sense, more instrumental for the analysis then the risk conveyed
in a low prior. When prices are sufficiently low we find out that crowdfunding
campaigns do not provide any value in terms of sieving out the bad products
from the good ones. In fact, for such prices, as intuition suggests, participation is
maximal and the correctness index is equal the prior probability.
Typically, the maximal participation decreases as the signal quality improves.
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However, this is no longer true for sufficiently high prices. In such cases we notice
that the correctness index approaches one as the price approaches the maximal
value of one.
In our model we show that whenever the product is bad the expected number of
contributions roughly equals the campaign’s threshold. Thus, for risky products,
ones that exhibit high risk, the unconditional participation index is almost equal
the threshold. This is indeed observed in field data as reported in [10] and [14].
A crucial primitive of our model is the information structure, composed of the
initial common prior regarding the product quality and the accuracy of the signals
available to each of the agents. Our analysis allows for comparative statics and
shows how the two indices behave as functions of the informational primitives.
Holding the price fixed our model predicts that the aforementioned Correctness
index decreases the as the product becomes more risky (a lower prior for the
good state). In addition, higher prices induce higher correctness as they decrease
players’ expected utility from contributing.
6 Concluding remarks
Crowdfunding is often used by many entrepreneurs to validate the market demand
for innovative products or an art project. We study how well do Crowdfunding
campaigns perform in this context. To do so we introduce a vary simple game
of incomplete information which we call the Crowdfunding game. We consider
two success measures for a Crowdfunding game. First, the ‘Correctness index’
of a game which captures how well information is aggregated, and second, the
‘Participation index’ that reflects how convincing the campaign is. We show that
for large populations information is not fully aggregated and we provide bounds
on the correctness and penetration index for large populations.
Our results are primarily asymptotic. However, calculations show that these
asymptotic bounds provide good approximations for realistic values of populations
size, sometimes as small 10 players. In fact, even when the number of players is
finite, all three parameters we measure: σ∗, the Correctness index θ and the
Participation index R, are quite close to their respective asymptotic values. This
observation is robust to the game parameters n,B, µ, p, τ .
21
6.1 Future directions of research
The static model we study is quite elementary and a few natural extensions that
could possibly change some of the qualitative results are called for.
• Realistically, the value of many goods has a private component and so we
would like to study how crowdfunding performs in an environment where the
value of the good has some private component, in addition to the common
component.
• In most campaigns firms offer a menu of bundles (or variants) and prices. In
our model we reduced this to a single product. We would like to verify that
our reduction is not critical for the qualitative observations that we have
•
Finally, as already mentioned in the introduction, most campaigns take place
over a period of time and a dynamic model may be called for. We suspect that
in such a model the equilibrium analysis will show that most (if not all) the
activity takes place in the final stage, in which case our static model serves as a
meaningful approximation. Obviously, nothing guarantees that and a reasonable
hypothesis is that more knowledgeable players will tend to move earlier as well as
more optimistic players.
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A Missing Proofs
Before stating our auxiliary lemmas and proofs let us recap some of the rele-
vant notation and introduce some new notation. Given a crowdfunding game,
Γ = Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ) all the notation refers to its unique non-trivial symmetric
equilibrium strategy σ∗ and all the random variables pertain to the distribution,
PrΓ,σ∗ over Ω× Sn, given by the fundamentals of the game and σ∗.
• For s ∈ {l, h}, let σ∗(si) = Pr(ai = 1|si), is the probability in which a player
with signal s contributes.
• For any action vector (a1, . . . , an) ∈ {o0, 1}n let cn =
∑n
i=1 ai be the number
of contributions.
• For any γ ∈ [0, 1] we let z(γ, n) denote a binomial random variable with n
trials and a probability for success γ. Formally, z(γ, n) ∼ Bin(γ, n).
• For k ∈ {1 . . . n} define ϕ(γ, n, k) = Prσ(z(γ, n) ≥ k). In words, it is the
probability for k successes or more in n independent trials.
• The probability, according to a strategy σ, to contribute in state H is αH =
Prσ(ai = 1|ω) = pσ(h) + (1− p)σ(l).
• The probability, according to a strategy σ, to contribute in state L is αL =
Prσ(ai = 1|ω = L) = (1− p)σ(h) + pσ(l).
• The probability of a successful campaign in the equilibrium of the game
Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ), conditional on state ω is Pr(cn ≥ B|ω) = PrΓ,σ∗(cn ≥
B|ω) = ϕ(αω, n, B).
The utility of consumer i with signal si is:
Eui(ai = 1|si) =
Prσ(ω = H|si)Prσ(cn−1 ≥ B − 1|ω = H)(1− τ) (16)
− Prσ(ω = L|si)Prσ(cn−1 ≥ B − 1|ω = L)τ =
Prσ(ω = H|si)ϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ)− Prσ(ω = L|si)ϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1)τ.
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The player’s expected utility induced by each signal is then:
Eui(ai = 1|h) =
pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)ϕ(α
H , n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ) (17)
− (1− p)(1− µ)
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)ϕ(α
L, n− 1, B − 1)τ
Eui(ai = 1|l) =
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)ϕ(α
H , n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ) (18)
− p(1− µ)
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)ϕ(α
L, n− 1, B − 1)τ.
Proof of Theorem 1
The following lemma specifies some characteristics of symmetric equilibria. Infor-
mally it suggests that the high type player is always more keen about contributing
than the low type one.
Lemma 2. Let σ∗ is a symmetric non-trivial Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in Γ,
then
if σ∗(l) > 0 then σ∗(h) = 1
if σ∗(h) < 1 then σ∗(l) = 0
and
if σ∗(l) < 1 then ϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1) > ϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1)
if σ(l) = 1 then ϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1) = ϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1) = 1.
Proof. First assume that in equilibrium, the low player contributes with positive
probability, that is σ∗(l) > 0. By equation (17), the following condition for the
low type player must be satisfied,
EΓ,σ∗ui(ai = 1|si = l) ≥ 0⇔ µ(1−p)ϕ(αH, n−1, B−1)(1−τ) ≥ (1−µ)pϕ(αL, n−1, B−1)τ.
As p > 1
2
this entails that
µpϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ) > (1− µ)(1− p)ϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1)τ.
Note that if the above condition holds, the high player’s expected utility from
contributing is strictly positive by equation (17), therefore, contributing is her
best response when other players play σ∗ in the game Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ).
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Next assume that the high player assigns a positive probability to opting-out,
that is σ∗(h) < 1. Then by equation (17), the following condition for the high type
player must be satisfied,
Eui(ai = 1|si = h) ≤ 0⇔ µpϕ(αH, n−1, B−1)(1−τ) ≤ (1−µ)(1−p)ϕ(αL, n−1, B−1)τ.
As p > 1
2
this entails
µ(1− p)ϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ) < (1− µ)pϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1)τ.
Note that by equation (17), whenever the condition above is satisfied, the utility
of the low players is always negative, i.e, Eui(ai = 1|si = l) < 0. Therefore, when
all other players play σ∗, the low players best response is to opt-out.
Therefore if σ(l)∗ < 1 then σ∗(h) > σ∗(l) and by the definition of ϕ(·, ·, ·), αω,
ϕ(αH , n − 1, B − 1) > ϕ(αL, n − 1, B − 1), and if σ(l) = 1 then σ(h) = 1 and
ϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1) = ϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1) = 1.
Next we show that in any crowdfunding game there can be at most one sym-
metric non-trivial equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Let σ be a non-trivial, symmetric strategy in Γ. If σ(l) ∈ (0, 1)
and EΓ,σui(ai = 1|si = l) = 0, then for any non-trivial, symmetric strategy σ˜ =
(σ˜(l), σ(h)) such that σ˜(l) ∈ [0, σ(l)), EΓ,σ˜ui(ai = 1|si = l) > 0; and for any non-
trivial, symmetric strategy σ˜ = (σ˜(l), σ(h)) such that σ˜(l) ∈ (σ(l), 1], EΓ,σ˜ui(ai =
1|si = l) < 0.
Proof. Fix the game parameters p, µ, n, B and τ. Let f be the following function
on [0, 1]2:
f(λ;ψ) =
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)ϕ(pψ + (1− p)λ, n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ) (19)
−(1− (1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ))ϕ((1− p)ψ + pλ, n− 1, B − 1)τ.
Note that f is the expected utility of a low player in Γ when the players play a
symmetric strategy σ where σ(h) = ψ and σ(l) = λ. We fix the parameter ψ. Let
σ be the strategy described in the proposition and let ψ¯ denote the probability
that the high player contributes. Now let f(λ) = f(λ, ψ¯) be a single parameter
function.
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Recall that f(λ) is continuous in λ, therefore, to prove that there is at most
one value of λ for which f(λ) = 0 it suffices to prove that whenever f(λ) = 0 then
f ′(λ) < 0. Moran: Is it clearer now?
Assume to the contrary that there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) where f(λ) = 0 and
f ′(λ) ≥ 0.
Taking the derivative of f entails
f ′(λ) =
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)(1− p)ϕ
′(pψ + (1− p)λ, n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ)
−(1 − (1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ))pϕ
′((1− p)ψ + pλ, n− 1, B − 1)τ.
As p > 1
2
,
0 < f ′(λ) < (20)
p
( (1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)ϕ
′(pψ + (1− p)λ, n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ)
−(1− (1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ))ϕ
′((1− p)ψ + pλ, n− 1.B − 1)τ).
By a standard argument (see for example Feller [6], pp. 173), for any ρ ∈ (0, 1)
ϕ′(ρ, n− 1, B − 1) = (n− 1)(n−2
B−2
)
ρB−2(1− ρ)n−B therefore, by equation (20), the
assumption f ′(λ) ≥ 0 entails the following condition,
0 ≤ f ′(λ) < Cη(n− 1, B − 2)
where C = (n− 1)(n−2
B−2
)
p and
η(k, n) = (21)
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)(pψ + (1− p)λ)
k(1− (pψ + (1− p)λ))n−k(1− τ)−
(1− (1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ))(1− p)ψ + pλ)
k(1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ))n−kτ.(22)
As C > 0 and we assume f ′(λ) > 0, it must be the case that η(B − 2, n− 1) > 0.
Next we show that η(k, n− 1) > 0 yields that η(k + 1, n− 1) > 0. To see this
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note,
η(k + 1, n− 1) =
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)
(pψ + (1− p)λ)k+1(1− (pψ(1− p)λ))n−1−(k+1)(1− τ )
− (1−
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)
)((1− pψ + pλ))k+1(1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ))n−1−(k+1)τ
=
(pψ + (1− p)λ)
1− (pψ + (1− p)λ)
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)
(pψ + (1− p)λ)k(1− (pψ + (1− p)λ))n−1−k(1− τ )
−
(1− p)ψ + pλ
1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ)
(1−
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ)
)((1− p)ψ + pλ)k(1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ))n−1−kτ
≥
(1− p)ψ + pλ
1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ)
η(k, n− 1).
Where the last inequality holds as p > 1
2
, ψ ≥ λ thus
pψ + (1− p)λ > (1− p)ψ + pλ
and the function x
1−x
increases monotonically whenever x ∈ (0, 1).
The assumption f ′(λ) ≥ 0 entails that η(B − 2, n− 1) > 0 . By definition of
Binomial distribution (see for example [6], pp. 147) f(λ) =
∑n−1
k=B−1
(
n−1
k
)
η(k, n−
1) >
∑n−1
k=B−1 η(B − 2, n − 1) > 0. This is in contradiction with our assumption
that f(λ) = 0.
Proposition 2. Let σ be a non-trivial, symmetric strategy in Γ. If σ(h) ∈ (0, 1)
and EΓ,σui(ai = 1|si = h) = 0, then for any non-trivial, symmetric strategy
σ˜ = (σ(l), σ˜(h)) such that σ˜(h) ∈ [0, σ(h)), EΓ,σ˜ui(ai = 1|si = h) > 0; and for
any non-trivial, symmetric strategy σ = (σ(l), σ˜(h)) such that σ˜(h) ∈ (σ(h), 1],
EΓ,σ˜ui(ai = 1|si = h) < 0.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 is very similar to that of Proposition 1. Fix the
game parameters p, µ, n, B and τ. Let fˆ be the following function on [0, 1]2 :ψ, λ ∈
(0, 1), ψ ≥ λ We define the function
fˆ(ψ;λ) =
pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)ϕ(pψ + (1− p)λ, n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ) (23)
− (1− pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ))ϕ((1− p)ψ + pλ, n− 1, B − 1)τ.
Note that fˆ is the expected utility of a high player in Γ when the players play
a symmetric strategy σ where σ(h) = ψ and σ(l) = λ. We fix the parameter λ.
Let σ be the strategy described in the proposition and let λ¯ denote the probability
that the high player contributes. Now let fˆ(ψ) = fˆ(λ¯, ψ) be a single parameter
function.
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Recall that fˆ(ψ) is continuous in ψ, therefore, to prove that there is at most
one value of ψ for which fˆ(ψ) = 0 it suffices to prove that whenever fˆ(ψ) = 0
then fˆ ′(ψ) < 0. Moran: Is it clearer now?
Assume to the contrary that there exists ψ ∈ (0, 1) where fˆ(ψ) = 0 and
fˆ ′(ψ) ≥ 0.
Taking the derivative of fˆ entails
fˆ ′(ψ) =
pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)pϕ
′(pψ + (1− p)λ, n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ) (24)
−(1− pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ))(1− p)ϕ
′((1− p)ψ + pλ, n− 1, B − 1)τ.
As p < 1,
0 < fˆ ′(ψ) < p
1−p
(
pµ
pµ+(1−p)(1−µ)
ϕ′(pψ + (1− p)λ, n− 1, B − 1)(1− τ)
−(1− pµ
pµ+(1−p)(1−µ)
)ϕ′((1− p)ψ + pλ, n− 1.B − 1)τ).
By a standard argument (see for example Feller [6] pp.173), for any ρ ∈ (0, 1)
ϕ′(ρ, n − 1, B − 1) = (n − 1)(n−2
B−2
)
ρB−2(1 − ρ)n−B therefore, the condition above
entails, 0 ≤ fˆ ′(λ) < Cˆηˆ(n− 1, B − 2) where Cˆ = (n− 1)(n−2
B−2
)
p
1−p
and
ηˆ(k, n) = pµ
pµ+(1−p)(1−µ)
(pψ + (1− p)λ)k(1− (pψ + (1− p)λ))n−k(1− τ)
−(1− pµ
pµ+(1−p)(1−µ)
)(1− p)ψ + pλ)k(1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ))n−kτ.
As Cˆ > 0 and we assume fˆ ′(ψ) > 0, it must be the case that η(B − 2, n− 1) > 0.
Next we show that ηˆ(k, n− 1) > 0 yields that ηˆ(k + 1, n− 1) > 0 as well.
ηˆ(k + 1, n− 1) = pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)
(
pψ + (1− p)λ)k+1(1− (pψ(1− p)λ))n−1−(k+1)(1− τ)
−(1 − pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ))((1− (pψ + pλ))
k+1(1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ))n−1−(k+1)τ =
(pψ + (1− p)λ)
1− (pψ + (1− p)λ)
pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)(pψ + (1− p)λ)
k(1− (pψ + (1− p)λ))n−1−k(1− τ)
− pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)(1−
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ p(1− µ))((1− p)ψ + pλ)
k(1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ))n−1−kτ
≥ (1− p)ψ + pλ
1− ((1− p)ψ + pλ) ηˆ(k, n− 1).
Where the last inequality holds as p > 1
2
, ψ ≥ λ thus
pψ + (1− p)λ > (1− p)ψ + pλ
and the function x
1−x
increases monotonically whenever x ∈ (0, 1).
30
The assumption fˆ ′(λ) ≥ 0 entails that ηˆ(B − 2, n− 1) > 0 . By definition of
Binomial distribution (see for example [6], pp. 147) fˆ(λ) =
∑n−1
k=B−1
(
n−1
k
)
ηˆ(k, n−
1) >
∑n−1
k=B−1 ηˆ(B − 2, n − 1) > 0. This is in contradiction with our assumption
that fˆ(λ) = 0.
Lemma 3. No crowdfunding game has more than one symmetric non-trivial
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the first part of the theorem, that is for any n,B, µ, p, τ there can
be at most a single non-trivial symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium in Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ).
Let σ be a symmetric, non-trivial strategy of Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ).We separate the proof
into cases and search for strategies that are candidates for equilbria.
Case 1. σ(h) = 1: Consider the following sub-cases: (1.1) First assume that
Eσ=(σ(l)=λ,σ(h)=1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) = 0
for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Note that if the other low players play λˆ < λ, then by
Proposition 1, Eσ=(λˆ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) > 0. In this case a low player’s best
response is to contribute. For any strategy in which λˆ > λ, again by Proposition
1, Eσ=(λˆ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) < 0 and opting-our is a low player’s best response.
However if σ(l) = λ, then a low type player is indifferent between the actions
and can not profit from increasing the probability she assigns to any one of the
pure actions. In addition, by Lemma 2, if low players mix, then the high player
has a dominant strategy σ(h) = 1, therefore, in this case, the only non-trivial,
symmetric equilibrium can be σ = (σ(l) = λ, σ(h = 1)).
(1.2) Assume that
Eσ=(λ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) 6= 0
for every λ ∈ [0, 1]. By the continuity of Eσ=(λ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) it must be that
EΓ,σ=(λ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) > 0 or Eσ=(λ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) < 0 for every λ. If
Eσ=(λ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) > 0 for every λ ∈ [0, 1] then when σ(h) = 1, contributing
is a best response strategy for a low player and the only equilibrium of this form can
only be σ(l) = σ(h) = 1. If Eσ=(λ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) < 0 for every λ. then opting-
out is a dominant action for a low type player. If Eσ=(0,1)ui(ai = 1|si = h) ≥ 0,
then, by Proposition 2, σ = σ(l) = 0, σ(h) = 1 is the only equilibrium candidate. If
Eσ=(0,1)ui(ai = 1|si = h) < 0, then we claim that opting-out is a dominant strategy
for low players. To see this, assume to the contrary that Eσ=(0,1)ui(ai = 1|si =
h) < 0, and there exists some λ ∈ (0, 1] such that Eσ=(λ,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) ≥ 0,
which, by Proposition 1 entails that Eσ=(0,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l) > 0. a contradiction
as Eσ=(0,1)ui(ai = 1|si = h) > Eσ=(0,1)ui(ai = 1|si = l).
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Case 2. σ(h) < 1 : By Lemma 2, the only candidates for non-trivial symmetric
equilibria can strategies in which σ(l) = 0.We separate the proof to two sub-cases.
(2.1) Assume that
Eσ=(σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψ)ui(ai = 1|si = h) = 0
for some ψ ∈ (0, 1].Then, by Proposition 2, for every ψ˜ ∈ [0, ψ), Eσ=(σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψ˜)ui(ai =
1|si = h) > 0 therefore high player is best if she contributes when all other players
play σ = (σ(l) = 0, σ(h) = ψ˜) and for every ψ˜ ∈ (ψ, 1] Eσ=(σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψ˜)ui(ai =
1|si = h) < 0 therefore high player is best if she opts-out. The high players is in-
different, only when σ(h) = ψ, therefore she can not profit by deviating. Note that
as Eσ=(σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψ)ui(ai = 1|si = h) = 0, low player’s best response is σ(l) = 0.
(2.2) Assume that
Eσ=(σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψ)ui(ai = 1|si = h) 6= 0
for every ψ ∈ (0, 1). By the continuity of Eσ=(σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψ)ui(ai = 1|si = h), A non-
trivial symmetric equilibrium can only occur if for every ψ, Eσ=(σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψ)ui(ai =
1|si = h) > 0, In this case we get that an equilibrium can occur only when
σ(h) = 1. This case was analyzed in case (1) above.
We conclude, If Eσ=(0,1)ui(a = 1|si = h) > 0 then σ∗(h) = 1. In addition: if
Eσ=(0,1)ui(a = 1|si = l) < 0 then σ∗(l) = 0; if Eσ=(1,1)ui(a = 1|si = l) ≥ 0 then
σ∗(l) = 1; Otherwise, by Lemma 1, there exist λ ∈ (0, 1) for which Eσ=(λ,1)ui(a =
1|si = l) = 0 and σ∗(l) = λ.
Else if Eσ=(0,1)ui(a = 1|si = h) < 0 then σ∗(l) = 0. In addition if Eσ=(0,0)ui(a =
1|si = h) > 0 then by Proposition 2, there exist ψ ∈ (0, 1) such that Eσ=(0,ψ)ui(a =
1|si = h) = 0. By Proposition 2 again, Eσ=(0,ψ˜)ui(a = 1|si = l) < 0 for any ψ˜ ∈
[0, ψ), therefore if a high players plays the strategy σ(h) = ψ˜, any high player can
profit by deviating to action 1 and similarly if high players play σ(h) = ψ˜ ∈ (ψ, 1],
any high player can profit by deviating to action 0.When high players play σ(h) =
ψ, high players have no profitable deviation. In addition, as Eσ=(0,ψ)ui(a = 1|si =
h) = 0 > Eσ=(0,ψ)ui(a = 1|si = l), low players can not gain by deviating to action
1 and thus σ∗(l) = 0, σ∗(h) = ψ is an equiblirium. Finally, if Eσ=(0,0)ui(a = 1|si =
h) ≤ 0 then, there is no non-trivial symmetric equilibrium of Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ).
To complete the proof we will show that for any 4−tuple of parameters (q, µ, p, τ)
where q ∈ (0, 1), and for any there exists some N such that for any n > N, the
crowdfunding game Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ) has a unique non-trivial Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium.
Next we will prove the second part of Theorem 1.
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Lemma 4. Let q ∈ (0, 1) and {Bn}∞n=1 be a sequence of thresholds such that
limn→∞
Bn
n
= q ∈ (0, 1]. For every 3-tuple µ, q, τ there exists N(µ, q, τ) such that
every n > N(µ, q, τ), there exist a unique non-trivial symmetric equilibrium of
Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ).
Proof. Assume to the contrary that for some tuple (µ, q, τ) and a sequence of
thresholds {Bn}∞n=1 for which limn→∞ Bnn = q, there exists an arbitrarily large n
such that the corresponding game Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ) has no non-trivial symmetric
equilibrium.
This entails that for every ψ ∈ (0, 1],
EΓn,σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψui(ai = 1|si = h) < 0.
To see this, first consider a case in which the expected utility for high player is
positive for every ψ ∈ (0, 1), in this case, action 1 is a dominant strategy for
high players and thus a non-trivial symmetric equilibrium or the form σ∗(h) =
1, σ∗(l) ∈ [0, 1] exists; second consider a case in which there exists ψ ∈ (0, 1) for
which EΓn,σ(l)=0,σ(h)=ψui(ai = 1|si = h) = 0. By Proposition 2 there can be at
most one such ψ. Note that this yields that σ∗(h) = ψ, σ∗(l) = 0 as no player can
gain from deviating to any of the pure actions.
Therefore, by the contrary assumption, for any ψ ∈ (0, 1] following condition
holds,
pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)ϕ(pψ, n− 1, Bn − 1)(1− τ)−
(1− p)(1− µ)
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)ϕ((1− p)ψ, n− 1, Bn − 1)τ < 0⇔
pµ
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)ϕ(pψ, n− 1, Bn − 1)(1− τ) < (25)
(1− p)(1− µ)
pµ+ (1− p)(1− µ)ϕ((1− p)ψ, n− 1, Bn − 1)τ ⇔
pµ(1− τ)
(1− p)(1− µ)τ <
ϕ((1− p)ψ, n− 1, Bn − 1)
ϕ(pψ, n− 1, Bn − 1) .
As stated above, equation (25) must be satisfied for any ψ ∈ (0, 1], including
arbitrarily small values and thus,
pµ(1− τ)
(1− p)(1− µ)τ < limψ→0
ϕ((1− p)ψ, n− 1, Bn − 1)
ϕ(pψ, n− 1, Bn − 1) . (26)
By the definition of ϕ(·, ·, ·),
lim
ψ=0
ϕ((1− p)ψ, n− 1, Bn − 1) = lim
ψ→0
ϕ((1− p)ψ, n− 1, Bn − 1) = 0,
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and hence we must apply L’hopital’s rule to calculate the limit of the right-hand
side of equation (26), that is,
pµ(1− τ)
(1− p)(1− µ)τ < limψ→0
ϕ′((1− p)ψ, n− 1, Bn − 1)
ϕ′(pψ, n− 1, Bn − 1) . (27)
By a standard argument (see for example Feller [6] pp.173),
ϕ(γ, n− 1, B − 1) = (n− 1)
(
n− 2
B − 2
)∫ γ
0
tB−2(1− t)n−Bdt. (28)
and hence
ϕ′(γ, n− 1, B − 1) = (n− 1)
(
n− 2
B − 2
)
γB−2(1− γ)n−B. (29)
Therefore
lim
ψ→0
ϕ((1− p)ψ, n− 1, B − 1)
ϕ(pψ, n− 1, B − 1) = limψ→0
ϕ′((1− p)ψ, n− 1, B − 1)(1− p)
ϕ′(pψ, n− 1, B − 1)p =
lim
ψ→0
(
(1− p)
p
)B−1(
1− (1− p)ψ
1− pψ )
n−B =
(
1− p
p
)B−1.
(30)
We plug this into equation (31) and get,
pµ(1− τ)
(1− p)(1− µ)τ < (
1− p
p
)Bn−1, (31)
a contradiction as p > 1
2
and n is arbitrarily large (and thus so is Bn).
Theorem 1 joins together Lemmas 4 and 3.
Theorem 1. (1) No crowdfunding game has more than one symmetric non-trivial
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. (2) Consider the sequence {Bn}∞n=1 where limn→∞ Bnn = q
for some q ∈ (0, 1]. For any 4-tuple of parameters (q, µ, p, τ) there exists some N
such that for any n > N, the crowdfunding game Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ) has a unique
symmetric non-trivial Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
A.1 Additional Proofs.
The following lemma is almost immediate by Lemma 2,
Lemma 5. For every si ∈ {l, h}, if τ < Pr(ω = H|si) then σ∗(ai = 1|si) = 1.
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Proof. The expected utility for player i from the action ai = 1 is
Pr(ω = H|si)(1−τ)ϕ(αH , n−1, B−1)−(1−Prµ(ω = H|si))τϕ(αL, n−1, B−1).
By Lemma 2 we know that ϕ(αH , n − 1, B − 1) ≥ ϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1) and as σ∗
is non-trivial we know that ϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1) > 0 therefore,
Pr(ω = H|si)(1− τ)ϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1)− (1− Prµ(ω = H|si))τϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1) ≥
(Prµ(ω = H|si)(1− τ)− (1− Prµ(ω = H|si))τ)ϕ(αH , n− 1, B − 1) > 0.
Where the last inequality holds as we assume τ < Pr(ω = H|si).
By Lemma 5, we can distinguish between three crowdfunding game types by
the relationship between µ, the prior for state H and the pre-determined price
level τ. In Game Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ), the price will be called cheap if τ < Prµ(ω =
H|si = l) = µ(1−p)µ(1−p)+p(1−µ) ; the price will be called moderate if τ ∈ [Prµ(ω = H|si =
l), P rµ(ω = H|si = l) = [ (1−p)µ(1−p)µ+p(1−µ) , pµpµ+(1−p)(1−µ) ); and finally, the price will be
called expensive if τ > pµ
pµ+(1−p)(1−µ)
.
Let {Bn}∞n=1 be a sequence of thresholds such that limn→∞ Bn,n= q for some
q ∈ (0, 1). For every µ, p, τ let Γn denote the corresponding game Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ).
We denote the non-trivial symmetric equilibria of Γn by σ
∗
n. By by taking a sub-
sequence if necessary, the limit limn→∞ σ
∗
n = σ
∗
∞, exists and is the non-trivial,
symmetric equilibrium of game Γ∞. By Theorem 1 we know this is well defined.
Lemma 6. If q ≥ 1− p then for every µ, p, τ,
σ∗∞(h) = 1.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exist a sequence {Bn}∞n=1 such that
limn→∞
Bn
n
= q > 1− p, and the corresponding sequence of equilibrium strategies
{σ∗n} converges to σ∗∞(h) = ψ for some ψ ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 2, if σ∗∞(h) < 1 then
σ∗∞(l) = 0.
In addition, by the law of large numbers, the expected number of contributions
cLn ≡
∑
i ai in state ω = L is
lim
n→∞
cLn = (1− p)ψ < q,
and thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n − 1, Bn − 1) = 0. Therefore for sufficiently large n,
Eσ∗nu(ai = 1|si = l) > 0, a contradiction as low player profits by deviating to the
pure action 1.
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Lastly, we follow [16] and [12] and show that in our model, players are (almost)
non-pivotal.
Lemma 7. Consider any tuple p, µ, tau, q and any sequence of thresholds {Bn}
such that limn→∞
Bn
n
= q. Let {Γn}, denote the corresponding sequence of crowd-
funding games and the corresponding equlibria sequence {σ∗n} the following equality
must be satisfied,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αω, n− 1, Bn − 1) = lim
n→∞
ϕ(αω, n− 1, Bn − 1)
Proof. Let cωn denote the expected number of contributions. By definition of ϕ we
get,
ϕ(αω, n− 1, Bn − 1) = PrΓn,σ∗n(cωn ≥ bn − 1|ω) = PrΓn,σ∗n(
cωn − 1
n
≥ Bn
n
|ω).
The above equality must also hold in the limit and thus,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αω, n− 1, Bn − 1) = lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(
cωn − 1
n
≥ Bn
n
|ω) =
lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(
cωn
n
≥ Bn
n
|ω) =
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αω, n, Bn).
A.2 Proofs for cheap prices.
Theorem 3.1. In any crowdfunding game with a cheap price there exists a unique
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium where all players contribute. In particular,
this equilibrium is non-trivial.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 is immediate by Lemma 5 and the definition of
cheap price.
A.3 Proofs for moderate prices.
Theorem 3.3. For any crowdfunding game, Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ), with a moderate
price, there exists a unique symmetric non-trivial Bayesian Nash equilibrium
σ∗ = (σ∗1, . . . , σ
∗
n). Moreover, σ
∗
i has the following form,
σ∗i (si) =


1 if si = h
λ = λ(n,B, µ, p, τ)) ∈ [0, 1) if si = l.
. (32)
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Proof. By Lemma 5, in any crowdfunding game Γ with moderate price, σ∗(h) = 1.
First we show that σ∗(l) < 1. Let σ1 be the strategy profile in which all players
play the pure action 1. We use the following shorthand notation,
pl = PrΓ(ω = H|si = l) = µ(1− p)
p(1− µ) + µ(1− p)
and
ph = PrΓ(ω = H|si = h) = µp
pµ+ (1− µ)(1− p) .
As all players contribute under σ1, the threshold is achieved in both states with
probablity 1, and thus the expected utility of a low player is, EΓ,σ1ui(ai = 1|si =
l) = pl(1−τ)− (1−pl)τ < 0, where the last inequality stems from the assumption
of moderate prices. Therefore σ∗(l) < 1.
Next we show that there exists a non-trivial symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium
in any crowdfunding game with moderate price. We separate the proof into two
cases.
(1) For any λ ∈ [0, 1),
EΓ,σ(h)=1,σ(l)=λui(ai = 1|si = l) < 0.
In this case the action 0 is a low player’s best response against any symmetric
strategy. Therefore σ∗(l) = 0. By Lemma 5, σ∗(h) = 1 and thus σ∗(h) = 1, σ∗(l) =
0 is an equilibrium. Note that by definition of ϕ(cdot, cdot, cdot), the equilibrium
is non-trivial for any n,B, µ, p and a moderate τ.
(2) There exists some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
EΓ,σ(h)=1,σ(l)=λui(ai = 1|si = l) = 0.
By Proposition 1 there can be at most one such λ.We show that σ∗(h) = 1, σ∗(l) =
λ is the unique non-trivial equilibrium of Γ in this case. Note that σ∗(h) = 1 by
Lemma 5. In addition, by Propositoin 1, the low type player loses utility by
deviating to the pure action 1 and can not gain by deviating to the pure action
0.
Lemma 1. Let {Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ)}n be a sequence of moderately priced crowd-
funding games such that limn→∞
Bn
n
= q for some q ∈ [0, 1] and {σ∗n} be the
corresponding sequence of non-trivial symmetric equilibria. Then the limit equi-
librium strategy is:
lim
n→∞
σ∗n(l) =


0 if q ≤ 1− p
q−(1−p)
p
otherwise
and lim
n→∞
σ∗n(h) = 1. (33)
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Proof. By Lemma 5, σ∗(h) = 1 in any crowdfunding game with moderate price.
This also hold in the limit.
Next we show that if q < 1−p then limn→∞ σ∗n(l) = 0. Assume by contradiction
that limn→∞ σ
∗
n(l) = λ > 0. Let c
L
n = EΓn,σ∗n
∑
i ai|ω = L. That is Cn denote the
expected number of contributors in state L. Recall that by the law of large numbers
lim
n→∞
cLn
n
= αL = p+ (1− p)λ > 1− p > q,
therefore for sufficiently large n the low player expected utility is,
EΓn,σ∗nu(ai = 1|si = l) = pl(1− τ)− (1− pl)τ < 0
Where
pl = Pr(ω = H|si = l) = µ(1− p)
p(1− µ) + µ(1− p) .
The inequality holds as prices are moderate.
Finally we show that if q ≥ 1 − p then limn→∞ σ∗n(l) = q−(1−p)p . For any λ, if
limn→∞ σ
∗
n(l) = λ then by the law of large numbers,
lim
n→∞
cLn
n
= αL∞ = p+ (1− p)λ.
If λ < q−(1−p)
p
, then limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, B − 1) = 0, and thus,
lim
n→∞
EΓn,σ∗u(a = 1|s = l) = pl(1− τ) > 0.
Similarly if λ > q−(1−p)
p
, then limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, B − 1) = 1 and thus
lim
n→∞
EΓn,σ∗nu(a = 1|s = l) = pl(1− τ)− (1− pl)τ < 0,
where again, the inequality holds as prices are moderate.
The following corollary is immediate by Lemma 1.
Corollary 2. For any µ, p, a moderate price τ and a sequence {Bn} s.t. limn→∞ Bnn =
q for some q ∈ [0, 1], limn→∞ ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1) = 1.
In words, Corollary 2 states that if the price is moderate, the probability that
a campaign succeeds when the state is H approaches one as population grows.
Proof. By the Law of Large numbers, the expected number of contribution condi-
tional on the state beingH is, limn→∞
cHn
n
= limn→∞ α
H
n where α
H
n is the probability
of a player choosing action 1 in the non-trivial, symmetric equilibrium of game
Γn. By Lemma 1
lim
n→∞
αHn = p + (1− p)
q − (1− p)
p
> q.
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Theorem 5. For any large crowdfunding game with prior µ, signal quality p and
a moderate price τ the probability of making the correct choice is given by:
θ(µ, p, τ) = 1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ. (34)
Proof. First we show that θ(µ, p, τ) ≥ 1− 1−p
p
1−τ
τ
µ. Consider a sequence of thresh-
olds {Bn} such that Bn = n2 and the corresponding sequence of moderately priced
crowdfunding games {Γn} where Γn = Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ). As limn→∞Bn = 12 > 1−p,
by Lemma 1 we get that eventually, σ∗n(l) ∈ (0, 1) and thus in equilibrium, the
low player is indifferent between both actions yielding,
lim
n→∞
EΓn,σ∗nu(a = 1|s = l) = 0⇔ plϕ(αH∞, n−1, B−1)(1−τ)−(1−pl)ϕ(αL∞, n−1, B−1)τ = 0
where pl = Pr(ω = H|si = l) = µ(1−p)µ(1−p)+p(1−µ) . Recall that cωn = EΓn,σ∗n
∑
i(ai)|ω
is the expected number of contributions in state ω ∈ H,L. By the law of large
numbers
lim
n→∞
cωn
n
= αωn ,
where, as before, αωn is the probability that a player plays 1 in the equilibrium of
Γn when the state is ω ∈ H,L. As σ∗(h) = 1 we get that αH > p > 1
2
and thus,
when the state is H, the probability that the product be realized approaches 1
that is
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αHn , n− 1, B − 1) = 1.
By the low player indifference condition, we can therefore calculate the probability
the threshold be reached at the limit.
0 = lim
n→∞
EΓn,σ∗nu(a = 1|s = l) =
(1− p)µ
(1− p)µ+ (1− µ)p(1− τ)
− (1− µ)p
(1 − p)µ+ (1− µ)pτ limn→∞ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, B − 1).
Rearranging the above equality we get,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αLn , n− 1, B − 1) =
1− p
p
µ
1− µ
1− τ
τ
.
By definition of the correctness index,
lim
n→∞
θ(n,Bn =
n
2
, µ, p, τ) = µ+ (1− µ)1− p
p
µ
1− µ
1− τ
τ
= 1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ.
Therefore the expression in Theorem 1 is achievable.
To complete the proof we must show that θ(µ, p, τ) ≤ 1− 1−p
p
1−τ
τ
µ. Let {B∗n} be
a sequence of thresholds for which the maximal correctness is achieved. By taking
a subsequence if necessary, the limit limn→∞B
∗
n = q
∗ exists for some q∗ ∈ [0, 1].
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Next we show that q∗ > 1 − p. Assume to the contrary that q∗ < 1 − p.
By Theorem 4 for any n, σ∗n(h) = 1 therefore by the Law of large numbers, the
expected number of contributions when the state is L is limn→∞
cLn
n
= αLn > 1−p >
q∗ and thus the probability that the threshold is crossed when the state is L is,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αLn , n− 1, B − 1) = 1
and hence, by definition of the correctness index and under the contrary assump-
tion,
θ(p, µ, τ) = µ.
A contradiction as prices are moderate and thus,
1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ > µ⇔ 1− µ
µ
>
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
⇔ (1− p)µ
(1− µ)p+ (1− p)µ > τ,
and we have seen that the expression on the right is achievable. Therefore it must
be that the optimal sequence of thresholds is such that,
lim
n→∞
B∗n
n
= q∗ > 1− p.
As q∗ > 1−p, by Lemma 1, we get that the low player is eventually indifferent
in Γn and thus for sufficiently large n,
(1− p)µ(1− τ)ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1)− p(1− µ)τϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1)⇒
ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1) =
p(1− µ)τ
(1− p)µ(1− τ)ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, Bn − 1).
(35)
Assume to the contrary that for some µ, p and a moderate price τ,
θ(µ, p, τ) > 1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ = µ+ (1− µ)(1− 1− p
p
µ
1− µ
1− τ
τ
).
by the definition of correctness and the inequality above, This entails that there
exists a sequence of thresholds {B∗n} and a sequence of corresponding games Γn
such that limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n − 1, Bn − 1) < 1−pp µ1−µ 1−ττ . Therefore equation (35)
becomes,
ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1) =
p(1− µ)τ
(1− p)µ(1− τ)ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, Bn − 1) < 1, (36)
a contradiction as by Lemma 1, the expected proportion of contributions when
the state is H approaches
lim
n→∞
cHn
n
= lim
n→∞
αHn = p + (1− p)
q∗ − (1− p)
p
> q∗.
and thus, by the law of large numbers, limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n , n− 1, Bn − 1) = 1.
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Theorem 6. For any crowdfunding game with prior µ, signal quality p and a
moderate price τ , the participation ratio in a large campaign is given by:
R(µ, p, τ) = µ(1 +
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
) (37)
Proof. First we show that for any µ, p and a moderate price τ, R(µ, p, τ) ≥ µ(1 +
1−p
p
1−τ
τ
). Let {Bn} be a sequence of thresholds such that limn→∞ Bnn = q for some
q > 1−p. By Lemma 1, for sufficently large n, the low player is indifferent between
both actions and thus,
lim
n→∞
EΓn,σ∗nu(a = 1|s = l) = 0⇔
µ(1− p)(1− τ) lim
n→∞
ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1) = (1− µ)pτ lim
n→∞
ϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1).
By Corollary 2 limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n , n− 1, Bn − 1) = 1 and thus,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1) =
µ(1− p)(1− τ)
(1− µ)pτ . (38)
Recall that by Lemma 7, in large crowdfunding games players are (almost)
non-pivotal as,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αωn, n− 1, Bn − 1) = lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(c
ω
n − 1 ≥ Bn − 1) =
lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(
cωn
n
− 1
n
> q − 1
n
) = lim
n→∞
ϕ(αωn , n, Bn).
(39)
Thus, by the definition of Participation
lim
n→∞
R(Bn, nµ, p, τ) ≥ q(µ lim
n→∞
ϕ(αHn , n, Bn) + (1− µ) lim
n→∞
ϕ(αLn , n, Bn)) =
q(µ+ (1− µ)µ(1− p)(1− τ)
(1− µ)pτ ).
(40)
By taking q to 1 we can see that,
R(µ, p, τ) ≥ (µ+ (1− µ)µ(1− p)(1− τ)
(1− µ)pτ ) = µ(1 +
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
).
Next we prove thatR(µ, p, τ) ≤ µ(1+1−p
p
1−τ
τ
). By Corollary 2, limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n , n−
1, Bn − 1) = 1. Next note that
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1) =
lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(
cHn − 1
n
≥ Bn − 1
n
) =
lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(
cHn
n
≥ Bn
n
) = ϕ(αHn , n, Bn).
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Thus the maximal participation is bounded from above by
R(µ, p, τ) ≤ µ+ (1− µ)y∗
where y∗ is the solution of the following linear programming:
max µ+ (1− µ)y
s.t. 1 ≥ y ≥ 0
(1− p)µ(1− τ)− p(1− µ)yτ ≥ 0.
(41)
Which is simply y∗ = (1−p)µ(1−τ)
(1−p)µτ
and thus
R(µ, p, τ) ≤ µ(1 + 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
).
A.4 Proofs for expensive prices.
Theorem 7. Let {Γ(n,Bn, µ, p, τ)}n be a sequence of expensively priced crowd-
funding games such that limn→∞
Bn
n
= q for some q ∈ [0, 1]. Then the limit
equilibrium strategy is:
lim
n→∞
σ∗n(l) =


0 if q ≤ 1− p
q−(1−p)
p
otherwise
and lim
n→∞
σ∗n(h) =


q
1−p
if q ≤ 1− p
1 otherwise
(42)
Proof. First we prove the lemma for all sequences for which q > 1 − p. We start
by showing that in this case limn→∞ σ
∗
n(h) = 1. Assume to the contrary that there
exists some limn→∞
Bn
n
= q > 1−p for which limn→∞ σ∗n(h) < 1. Then, by Lemma
2, for sufficiently large n it must be that σ∗n(l) = 0. Therefore, by the Law of Large
Numbers,
lim
n→∞
cLn = lim
n→∞
αLn < 1− p < q
and thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, Bn− 1) = 0. In addition, as σ∗n(h) < 1 the following
inequality must be satisfied for the high-type player,
lim
n→∞
(pµ(1− τ)ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1)− (1− p)(1− µ)τϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1)) ≤ 0.
This entails a contradiction as σ∗n is a non trivial equilibrium and thus ϕ(α
H
n , Bn−
1, n− 1) > 0.
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As limn→∞ σ
∗
n(h) = 1, the proof that limn→∞ σ
∗
n(l) =
q−(1−p)
p
is similar to the
case of moderate prices and thus omitted.
Next we prove the lemma for all sequences for which q ≤ 1 − p. We start by
showing that in this case limn→∞ σ
∗
n(l) = 0. Assume to the contrary that there
exists some limn→∞
Bn
n
= q ≤ 1− p for which limn→∞ σ∗n(l) > 0. Then, by Lemma
2, for sufficiently large n it must be that σ∗n(h) = 1. Therefore, by the Law of
Large Numbers,
lim
n→∞
cLn = lim
n→∞
αLn > 1− p ≥ q
and thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, Bn − 1) = 1. In addition, as σ∗n(l) > 0 the following
inequality must be satisfied for the low-type player,
lim
n→∞
((1− p)µ(1− τ)ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1)− p(1− µ)τϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1)) =
(1− p)µ(1− τ)− p(1− µ)τ ≥ 0.
This entails a contradiction as the price is expensive. Therefore limn→∞ σ
∗
n(l) = 0.
Next assume by contradiction that there exist a sequence limn→∞
Bn
n
= q ≤
1− p for which limn→∞ σ∗n(h) > q1−p . By the law of large numbers,
lim
n→∞
cLn = lim
n→∞
αLn = (1− p) lim
n→∞
σ∗n(h) ≥ q
and thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, Bn − 1) = 1.
As limn→∞ σ
∗
n(h) > 0 the following inequality must be satisfied for high players,
lim
n→∞
pµ(1− τ)ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1)
− (1− p)(1− µ)τϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1) ≥ 0
⇔ pµ(1− τ)− (1− p)(1− µ)τ ≥ 0,
a contradiction as the price is expensive.
Finally, assume by contradiction that there exist a sequence limn→∞
Bn
n
= q ≤
1− p for which limn→∞ σ∗n(h) < q1−p . By the law of large numbers,
lim
n→∞
cLn = lim
n→∞
αLn = (1− p) lim
n→∞
σ∗n(h) < q
and thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n− 1, Bn − 1) = 0.
As limn→∞ σ
∗
n(l) = 0 the following inequality must be satisfied for low players,
lim
n→∞
pµ(1− τ)ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1)−
(1− p)(1− µ)τϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1) ≤ 0⇔
pµ(1− τ) lim
n→∞
ϕ(αHn , , n− 1, Bn − 1) ≤ 0,
a contradiction as the equilibrium is non-trivial.
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Theorem 8.
θ(µ, p, τ) = 1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ. (43)
Proof. First we show that θ(µ, p, τ) ≥ 1 − 1−p
p
1−τ
τ
µ. Consider the sequence {Bn}
where Bn =
n
2
and thus limn→∞
Bn
n
= 1
2
> 1 − p. By Theorem 7 the limit of the
sequence of non-trivial Bayes-Nash equilibria is
lim
n→∞
σ∗n(si) =


1 if si = h
1
2
−(1−p)
p
= 2p−1
p
if si = l
. (44)
Therefore for sufficiently large n, the low player must be indifferent between both
actions and the following equality must be satisfied,
Eσ∗nu(a = 1|s = l) = 0⇔
(1− p)µ(1− τ) lim
n→∞
ϕ(αHn , n− 1, Bn − 1)
− p(1− µ)τ lim
n→∞
ϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1) = 0.
In addition, by equation 44, limn→∞ c
H
n = limn→∞ α
H
n = p+(1−p)2p−1p > p > 12
and thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n , n− 1, Bn − 1) = 1 which yields,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αLn , n− 1, Bn − 1) =
1− p
p
µ
1− µ
1− τ
τ
.
Recall that by Lemma 7, in large crowdfunding games players are (almost)
non-pivotal as,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αωn, n− 1, Bn − 1) = lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(c
ω
n − 1 ≥ Bn − 1) =
lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(
cωn
n
− 1
n
> q − 1
n
) = lim
n→∞
ϕ(αωn , n, Bn).
(45)
Thus, by definition of the correctness index,
θ(µ, p, τ) ≥ lim
n→∞
θ(n,
n
2
, µ, p, τ) = µ+(1−µ)(1−1− p
p
µ
1− µ
1− τ
τ
) = 1−1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ.
Next we show that θ(µ, p, τ) ≤ 1− 1−p
p
1−τ
τ
µ. Let {B∗n} be a sequence of thresh-
olds for which the optimal correction is achieved. We show that limn→∞
B∗n
n
=
q∗ > 1− p. Assume by contradiction that limn→∞ B
∗
n
n
= q∗ ≤ 1− p. By Lemma 44,
this entails that,
lim
n→∞
cHn = lim
n→∞
αHn = p
q∗
1− p > q
∗,
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and thus limn→∞ ϕ(limn→∞ α
H
∞, B
∗
n − 1, n − 1) = 1. Again by Lemma 44, the
high player is eventually indifferent between both actions and thus the following
equality must be satisfied,
lim
n→∞
Eσ∗nu(a = 1|s = h) = 0⇔ pµ(1−τ)−(1−p)(1−µ)τ limn→∞ϕ( limn→∞α
L
n , n−1, B∗n−1) = 0
and thus ϕ(limn→∞ α
L
n , B
∗
n − 1, n− 1) = pµ(1−τ)(1−p)(1−µ)τ .
By the definition of correctness and by Lemma 7,
lim
n→∞
θ(n,B∗n, µ, p, τ) = µ+(1−µ)(1−
pµ(1− τ)
(1− p)(1− µ)τ ) = 1−
p
1− p
1− τ
τ
µ < 1−1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ,
a contradiction as we saw that the latter expression can be achieved for Bn =
n
2
.
As limn→∞
B∗n
n
= q∗ > 1 − p, by Lemma 44, high player eventually surely
contribute and low players eventually become indifferent between choosing both
actions, thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n n− 1, B∗n − 1) = 1. Therefore the maximal correctness
index is bounded from above by the following linear programming problem,
max µ+ (1− µ)(1− y)
s.t. 1 ≥ y ≥ 0
(1− p)µ(1− τ)− p(1− µ)yτ = 0.
Which is simply
y =
1− p
p
µ1− µ1− τ
τ
.
and thus by definition of asymptotic correctness,
θ(µ, p, τ) ≤ 1− 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
µ.
Theorem 9. • If µ < 1
3
and p ≤ √3 − 1, or if µ < 1
3
, p >
√
3 − 1 and
τ > 2µ
(1−µ)p+2(1−p)µ)
then
lim
n→∞
max
B∈{1...n}
Rµ(n,B, τ) = µp+ (1− µ)1− p
2
.
• Otherwise,
lim
n→∞
max
B∈{1...n}
Rµ(n,B, τ) = µ(1 +
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
)
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Proof. First note that in any game Γ(n,B, µ, p, τ), the participation is bounded
by
1(µϕ(αH, n− 1, B − 1) + (1− µ)ϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1)) ≥ R(n,B, µ, p, τ) ≥ (46)
≥ B
n
(µϕ(αH, n− 1, B − 1) + (1− µ)ϕ(αL, n− 1, B − 1)).
Next we show that the asymptotic participation is bounded from bellow by
the following expression
R(µ, p, τ) ≥ µ(1 + 1− p
p
1− τ
τ
).
Consider a sequence {Bn} such that Bn = n2 . As limn→∞ Bnn = 12 > 1− p, by The-
orem 7 and the law of large numbers we get that the proportion of contribution
when the state is H converges to, limn→∞ c
H
n = α
H
n = p + (1 − p)
1
2
−(1−p)
p
>
1
2
and thus the probability that the product succeeds in state H approaches
limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n , n, Bn) = 1.
In addition, by Lemma ??, the low player is eventually indifferent between
both actions, thus the following equality is satisfied for large ns,
lim
n→∞
Eσ∗nu(a = 1|s = l) = 0⇒ (1−p)µ(1−τ)−p(1−µ)τ limn→∞ϕ(α
H
n , Bn−1, n−1) = 0,
and thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n , Bn − 1, n− 1) = 1−pp 1−ττ µ1−µ . Recall that, by Lemma 7 in
large crowdfunding games players are (almost) non-pivotal as,
lim
n→∞
ϕ(αωn, n− 1, Bn − 1) = lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(c
ω
n − 1 ≥ Bn − 1) =
lim
n→∞
PrΓn,σ∗n(
cωn
n
− 1
n
> q − 1
n
) = lim
n→∞
ϕ(αωn , n, Bn).
(47)
By the definition of participation and asymptotic participation then,
R(µ, p, τ) ≥ lim
n→∞
R(n,
n
2
, µ, p, τ) = µ(1 +
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
). (48)
Next let {B∗n} be the sequence for which the maximal asymptotic participation
is achieved. We divide the proof into two cases. (1) where limn→∞
B∗n
n
= q∗ ≥ 1−p
and (2)limn→∞
B∗n
n
= q∗ < 1− p.
Case (1) limn→∞
B∗n
n
= q∗ ≥ 1−p: Similarily to our discussion for the sequence
{n
2
above, by Lemma 44, eventually high players contribute and low players are
indifferent between both actions and thus limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n , n − 1, B∗n − 1) = 1 and
limn→∞ ϕ(α
L
n , n−1, B∗n−1) = 1−pp 1−ττ µ1−µ . Therefore by equation 46, the following
condition is satisfied,
lim
n→∞
R(n,B∗n, µ, p, τ) ≤ µ+(1−µ)1 − p
p
1− τ
τ
µ
1− µ = µ(1+
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
). (49)
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This, together with equation (48) yields that if the maximal asymptotic partici-
pation is acheived for a sequence where limn→∞
B∗n
n
= q∗ ≥ 1− p, then
R(µ, p, τ = µ(1 +
1− p
p
1− τ
τ
)) ≡ R1.
We denote this expression by R1.
Case (2) limn→∞
B∗n
n
= q∗ < 1 − p: We can calculate the expected number of
contributions provided that the threshold is reached using the laws of conditional
expectation. First we present the calculations for ω = H. As before, one can
see that in state H the campaign will eventually succeeds. To see that recall by
Theorem 7,
lim
n→∞
cHn = αH( lim
n→∞
σ∗n) = p
q
1− p > q
and hence by the law of large numbers limn→∞ ϕ(α
H
n , n−1, Bn−1) = 1. Therefore,
at H, the sum of contributions conditional on the campaign success equals the
expected number of contributions and,
lim
n→∞
cHn |cHn ≥Bn−1 = limn→∞
cHn
n
= p
q
1− p. (50)
Next we calculate the expected number of contributions when omega = L and the
population size increases. We will use the ”Binomial approximation to Normal
distribution” (see [6]).
By [6] pp. 174 - 187, Let Z ∼ Bin(n, γ) be a random variable for some γ < 1
and define the transformation
R =
Z − nγ√
nγ(1− γ) .
By DeMoivre-Laplace limit theorem, as q < 1− p < 0.5 and n→∞, the distribu-
tion of R approaches the standard normal distribution (See [6] page 186, Theorem
2 and equation 3.18.). Therefore
lim
n→∞
Pr(Z > nγ) = lim
n→∞
Pr(R > 0) =
1
2
.
Next we calculate the conditional expected value of Z,
E(Z|Z > nγ) = E(
√
nγ(1− γ) ∗R + nγ|
√
nγ(1− γ) ∗R + nγ > nγ) =√
nγ(1− γ)E(R|
√
nγ(1− γ) ∗R > 0) + nγ =√
nγ(1− γ)E(R|R > 0) + nγ =
√
nγ(1− γ)
√
2
pi
+ nγ.
(51)
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As q < 1− p, By Theorem 7 we get that
lim
n→∞
cLn = α
L
n = (1− p)
q
1− p = q.
Therefore, by equation (51),
lim
n→∞
Eσ∗nc
L
n |
cLn
n
> q = lim
n→∞
1
2
(
√
2
pi
q(1− q)
n
+ q) =
q
2
. (52)
We plug in equations (50) and (52) and by the law of large numbers,
lim
n→∞
R(n,Bn, µ, p, τ) = µp
q
1− p + (1− µ)
q
2
. (53)
The expression in equation (53) increases in q therefore it will be reached when
q∗ → (1− p)−. Therefore if limn→∞ B
∗
n
n
= q∗ < 1− p we get that
R(µ, p, τ) = pµ+ (1− µ)1− p
2
≡ R2.
We denote the expression by R2.
For any 3-tuple (µ, p, τ) of expensive prices, the asymptotic participation index
will be R(µ, p, τ) = max{R1, R2}. Simple algebraic calculations show that R1 ≥
R2 if µ ≥ 13 or if µ < 13 and p ≤
√
3 − 1 or if µ < 1
3
and p >
√
3 − 1 and
τ > 2µ
(1−µ)p+2(1−p)µ
. Otherwise R2 > R1.
B Calculations for Crowdfunding Games.
Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.2 40 0.55 2 0.5 0 0 0.800 0
0.2 40 0.55 20 0.5 0.894 0 0.795 0.115
0.2 40 0.55 2 0.7 0 0 0.800 0
0.2 40 0.55 20 0.7 0.670 0 0.807 0.009
0.2 40 0.75 2 0.5 0.135 0 0.670 0.040
0.2 40 0.75 20 0.5 1 0.156 0.953 0.182
0.2 40 0.75 2 0.7 0 0 0.800 0
0.2 40 0.75 20 0.7 1 0.114 0.981 0.165
0.5 40 0.55 2 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
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Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.5 40 0.55 20 0.5 1 0.164 0.606 0.517
0.5 40 0.55 2 0.7 0 0 0.500 0
0.5 40 0.55 20 0.7 1 0 0.736 0.313
0.5 40 0.75 2 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 40 0.75 20 0.5 1 0.254 0.863 0.480
0.5 40 0.75 2 0.7 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 40 0.75 20 0.7 1 0.188 0.947 0.426
0.7 40 0.55 2 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 40 0.55 20 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 40 0.55 2 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.520
0.7 40 0.55 20 0.7 1 0.164 0.748 0.553
0.7 40 0.75 2 0.5 1 0 0.700 0.600
0.7 40 0.75 20 0.5 1 0.380 0.781 0.717
0.7 40 0.75 2 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.600
0.7 40 0.75 20 0.7 1 0.254 0.918 0.613
0.9 40 0.55 2 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 40 0.55 20 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 40 0.55 2 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 40 0.55 20 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 40 0.75 2 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 40 0.75 20 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 40 0.75 2 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 40 0.75 20 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.2 100 0.55 5 0.5 0 0 0.800 0
0.2 100 0.55 24 0.5 0.417 0 0.796 0.047
0.2 100 0.55 44 0.5 0.887 0 0.786 0.171
0.2 100 0.55 50 0.5 1 0 0.827 0.174
0.2 100 0.55 98 0.5 1 0.818 0.800 0.003
0.2 100 0.55 5 0.7 0 0 0.800 0
0.2 100 0.55 24 0.7 0.316 0 0.807 0.004
0.2 100 0.55 44 0.7 0.800 0 0.859 0.073
0.2 100 0.55 50 0.7 0.943 0 0.875 0.106
0.2 100 0.55 98 0.7 1 0.748 0.800 0
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Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.2 100 0.75 5 0.5 0.204 0 0.534 0.061
0.2 100 0.75 24 0.5 1 0 0.497 0.289
0.2 100 0.75 44 0.5 1 0.150 0.947 0.182
0.2 100 0.75 50 0.5 1 0.228 0.946 0.189
0.2 100 0.75 98 0.5 1 0.919 0.891 0.175
0.2 100 0.75 5 0.7 0.114 0 0.861 0.024
0.2 100 0.75 24 0.7 0.836 0 0.794 0.179
0.2 100 0.75 44 0.7 1 0.123 0.978 0.166
0.2 100 0.75 50 0.7 1 0.201 0.978 0.171
0.2 100 0.75 98 0.7 1 0.902 0.895 0.124
0.5 100 0.55 5 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 100 0.55 24 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 100 0.55 44 0.5 1 0.045 0.606 0.478
0.5 100 0.55 50 0.5 1 0.154 0.603 0.526
0.5 100 0.55 98 0.5 1 0.954 0.561 0.594
0.5 100 0.55 5 0.7 0.021 0 0.502 0
0.5 100 0.55 24 0.7 0.493 0 0.711 0.162
0.5 100 0.55 44 0.7 0.957 0 0.751 0.366
0.5 100 0.55 50 0.7 1 0.032 0.814 0.339
0.5 100 0.55 98 0.7 1 0.866 0.518 0.037
0.5 100 0.75 5 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 100 0.75 24 0.5 1 0 0.686 0.462
0.5 100 0.75 44 0.5 1 0.211 0.854 0.469
0.5 100 0.75 50 0.5 1 0.291 0.852 0.489
0.5 100 0.75 98 0.5 1 0.951 0.795 0.575
0.5 100 0.75 5 0.7 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 100 0.75 24 0.7 1 0 0.686 0.462
0.5 100 0.75 44 0.7 1 0.170 0.941 0.423
0.5 100 0.75 50 0.7 1 0.249 0.940 0.437
0.5 100 0.75 98 0.7 1 0.931 0.823 0.422
0.7 100 0.55 5 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 100 0.55 24 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 100 0.55 44 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
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Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.7 100 0.55 50 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 100 0.55 98 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 100 0.55 5 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.520
0.7 100 0.55 24 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.520
0.7 100 0.55 44 0.7 1 0.045 0.762 0.514
0.7 100 0.55 50 0.7 1 0.154 0.760 0.562
0.7 100 0.55 98 0.7 1 0.954 0.602 0.618
0.7 100 0.75 5 0.5 1 0 0.700 0.600
0.7 100 0.75 24 0.5 1 0.015 0.783 0.589
0.7 100 0.75 44 0.5 1 0.290 0.777 0.685
0.7 100 0.75 50 0.5 1 0.371 0.776 0.713
0.7 100 0.75 98 0.5 1 0.977 0.759 0.908
0.7 100 0.75 5 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.600
0.7 100 0.75 24 0.7 1 0 0.811 0.577
0.7 100 0.75 44 0.7 1 0.211 0.912 0.603
0.7 100 0.75 50 0.7 1 0.291 0.911 0.623
0.7 100 0.75 98 0.7 1 0.951 0.827 0.692
0.9 100 0.55 5 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 24 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 44 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 50 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 98 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 5 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 24 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 44 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 50 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.55 98 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 5 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 24 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 44 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 50 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 98 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 5 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
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Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.9 100 0.75 24 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 44 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 50 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 100 0.75 98 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.2 1000 0.55 50 0.5 0.097 0 0.790 0.016
0.2 1000 0.55 240 0.5 0.516 0 0.771 0.113
0.2 1000 0.55 440 0.5 0.958 0 0.766 0.211
0.2 1000 0.55 500 0.5 1 0.065 0.844 0.195
0.2 1000 0.55 980 0.5 1 0.948 0.810 0.100
0.2 1000 0.55 50 0.7 0.085 0 0.838 0.005
0.2 1000 0.55 240 0.7 0.497 0 0.904 0.078
0.2 1000 0.55 440 0.7 0.936 0 0.901 0.147
0.2 1000 0.55 500 0.7 1 0.050 0.934 0.148
0.2 1000 0.55 980 0.7 1 0.939 0.811 0.022
0.2 1000 0.75 50 0.5 0.214 0 0.436 0.064
0.2 1000 0.75 240 0.5 0.992 0 0.414 0.298
0.2 1000 0.75 440 0.5 1 0.223 0.938 0.189
0.2 1000 0.75 500 0.5 1 0.303 0.937 0.197
0.2 1000 0.75 980 0.5 1 0.963 0.934 0.263
0.2 1000 0.75 50 0.7 0.182 0 0.782 0.039
0.2 1000 0.75 240 0.7 0.930 0 0.759 0.199
0.2 1000 0.75 440 0.7 1 0.214 0.974 0.172
0.2 1000 0.75 500 0.7 1 0.294 0.973 0.178
0.2 1000 0.75 980 0.7 1 0.960 0.972 0.225
0.5 1000 0.55 50 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 1000 0.55 240 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 1000 0.55 440 0.5 1 0.006 0.596 0.462
0.5 1000 0.55 500 0.5 1 0.115 0.595 0.511
0.5 1000 0.55 980 0.5 1 0.968 0.586 0.845
0.5 1000 0.55 50 0.7 0.108 0 0.738 0.039
0.5 1000 0.55 240 0.7 0.533 0 0.749 0.209
0.5 1000 0.55 440 0.7 0.978 0 0.745 0.384
0.5 1000 0.55 500 0.7 1 0.078 0.831 0.379
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Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.5 1000 0.55 980 0.7 1 0.954 0.668 0.342
0.5 1000 0.75 50 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 1000 0.75 240 0.5 1 0 0.611 0.474
0.5 1000 0.75 440 0.5 1 0.243 0.840 0.477
0.5 1000 0.75 500 0.5 1 0.323 0.839 0.497
0.5 1000 0.75 980 0.5 1 0.970 0.834 0.659
0.5 1000 0.75 50 0.7 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 1000 0.75 240 0.7 1 0 0.611 0.474
0.5 1000 0.75 440 0.7 1 0.230 0.933 0.434
0.5 1000 0.75 500 0.7 1 0.309 0.932 0.448
0.5 1000 0.75 980 0.7 1 0.966 0.929 0.565
0.7 1000 0.55 50 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 1000 0.55 240 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 1000 0.55 440 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 1000 0.55 500 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 1000 0.55 980 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 1000 0.55 50 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.520
0.7 1000 0.55 240 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.520
0.7 1000 0.55 440 0.7 1 0.006 0.757 0.498
0.7 1000 0.55 500 0.7 1 0.115 0.757 0.547
0.7 1000 0.55 980 0.7 1 0.968 0.729 0.879
0.7 1000 0.75 50 0.5 1 0 0.700 0.600
0.7 1000 0.75 240 0.5 1 0 0.767 0.585
0.7 1000 0.75 440 0.5 1 0.268 0.770 0.677
0.7 1000 0.75 500 0.5 1 0.348 0.769 0.705
0.7 1000 0.75 980 0.5 1 0.977 0.767 0.925
0.7 1000 0.75 50 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.600
0.7 1000 0.75 240 0.7 1 0 0.767 0.585
0.7 1000 0.75 440 0.7 1 0.243 0.904 0.611
0.7 1000 0.75 500 0.7 1 0.323 0.903 0.631
0.7 1000 0.75 980 0.7 1 0.970 0.900 0.792
0.9 1000 0.55 50 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.55 240 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
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Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.9 1000 0.55 440 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.55 500 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.55 980 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.55 50 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.55 240 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.55 440 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.55 500 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.55 980 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 50 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 240 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 440 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 500 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 980 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 50 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 240 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 440 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 500 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 1000 0.75 980 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.2 5000 0.55 250 0.5 0.107 0 0.773 0.024
0.2 5000 0.55 1200 0.5 0.526 0 0.763 0.116
0.2 5000 0.55 2200 0.5 0.969 0 0.760 0.213
0.2 5000 0.55 2500 0.5 1 0.080 0.840 0.198
0.2 5000 0.55 4900 0.5 1 0.500 0.800 0
0.2 5000 0.55 250 0.7 0.103 0 0.903 0.016
0.2 5000 0.55 1200 0.7 0.518 0 0.899 0.081
0.2 5000 0.55 2200 0.7 0.960 0 0.898 0.151
0.2 5000 0.55 2500 0.7 1 0.073 0.932 0.151
0.2 5000 0.55 4900 0.7 1 0.500 0.800 0
0.2 5000 0.75 250 0.5 0.207 0 0.416 0.062
0.2 5000 0.75 1200 0.5 0.975 0 0.406 0.293
0.2 5000 0.75 2200 0.5 1 0.240 0.935 0.191
0.2 5000 0.75 2500 0.5 1 0.320 0.935 0.199
0.2 5000 0.75 4900 0.5 1 0.969 0.934 0.264
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Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.2 5000 0.75 250 0.7 0.193 0 0.760 0.041
0.2 5000 0.75 1200 0.7 0.948 0 0.750 0.203
0.2 5000 0.75 2200 0.7 1 0.236 0.972 0.174
0.2 5000 0.75 2500 0.7 1 0.316 0.972 0.180
0.2 5000 0.75 4900 0.7 1 0.968 0.972 0.226
0.5 5000 0.55 250 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 5000 0.55 1200 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 5000 0.55 2200 0.5 1 0 0.538 0.484
0.5 5000 0.55 2500 0.5 1 0.102 0.593 0.505
0.5 5000 0.55 4900 0.5 1 0.500 0.500 0
0.5 5000 0.55 250 0.7 0.111 0 0.750 0.044
0.5 5000 0.55 1200 0.7 0.534 0 0.743 0.210
0.5 5000 0.55 2200 0.7 0.978 0 0.741 0.384
0.5 5000 0.55 2500 0.7 1 0.086 0.827 0.381
0.5 5000 0.55 4900 0.7 1 0.500 0.500 0
0.5 5000 0.75 250 0.5 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 5000 0.75 1200 0.5 1 0 0.525 0.494
0.5 5000 0.75 2200 0.5 1 0.249 0.836 0.479
0.5 5000 0.75 2500 0.5 1 0.329 0.836 0.499
0.5 5000 0.75 4900 0.5 1 0.972 0.834 0.660
0.5 5000 0.75 250 0.7 1 0 0.500 0.500
0.5 5000 0.75 1200 0.7 1 0 0.525 0.494
0.5 5000 0.75 2200 0.7 1 0.243 0.930 0.436
0.5 5000 0.75 2500 0.7 1 0.323 0.930 0.451
0.5 5000 0.75 4900 0.7 1 0.970 0.929 0.566
0.7 5000 0.55 250 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 5000 0.55 1200 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 5000 0.55 2200 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 5000 0.55 2500 0.5 1 1 0.700 1
0.7 5000 0.55 4900 0.5 1 0.500 0.300 0
0.7 5000 0.55 250 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.520
0.7 5000 0.55 1200 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.520
0.7 5000 0.55 2200 0.7 1 0 0.723 0.510
55
Table 5: Calculations of equilibrium strategies and effi-
ciency for Small Crowdfunding Games
µ n p B τ ψ λ Θ R
0.7 5000 0.55 2500 0.7 1 0.102 0.756 0.541
0.7 5000 0.55 4900 0.7 1 0.500 0.300 0
0.7 5000 0.75 250 0.5 1 0 0.700 0.600
0.7 5000 0.75 1200 0.5 1 0 0.715 0.597
0.7 5000 0.75 2200 0.5 1 0.260 0.768 0.674
0.7 5000 0.75 2500 0.5 1 0.340 0.768 0.702
0.7 5000 0.75 4900 0.5 1 0.975 0.767 0.925
0.7 5000 0.75 250 0.7 1 0 0.700 0.600
0.7 5000 0.75 1200 0.7 1 0 0.715 0.597
0.7 5000 0.75 2200 0.7 1 0.249 0.902 0.612
0.7 5000 0.75 2500 0.7 1 0.329 0.902 0.632
0.7 5000 0.75 4900 0.7 1 0.972 0.900 0.793
0.9 5000 0.55 250 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.55 1200 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.55 2200 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.55 2500 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.55 4900 0.5 1 0.500 0.100 0
0.9 5000 0.55 250 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.55 1200 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.55 2200 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.55 2500 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.55 4900 0.7 1 0.500 0.100 0
0.9 5000 0.75 250 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 1200 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 2200 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 2500 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 4900 0.5 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 250 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 1200 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 2200 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 2500 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
0.9 5000 0.75 4900 0.7 1 1 0.900 1
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